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To President Barack Obama, “… the most important office in a democracy is the office 
of citizen. And, right now, with all the talent that’s out there, our government’s not 
working and our politics isn’t working as well as it should. The only way we’re going to 
solve that is to make sure that we’re getting citizens involved in ways that we haven’t up 





When Latinos Reject and Accept Uncertainty: Risk Attitudes and 
Political Mobilization 
 
Joe Robert Tafoya, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  David L. Leal 
 
In this dissertation, I examine how political participation is shaped by the 
avoidance and acceptance of risks (better known as “risk attitudes”). This relationship, I 
posit, influences Latino and Black political behavior as it helps to account for advantages, 
disadvantages, and differences in engagement compared to the white majority. First, I 
present the emergence of risk attitudes from prospect theory and its contribution to 
understanding human behavior. I develop a hypothesis for racial and ethnic minority 
differences in risk attitudes based on socioeconomic disadvantages and demographic and 
political differences with Whites. I uncover that differences in underpinnings of risk 
attitudes are unique to Latino political efficacy, whereby risk accepting Latinos are more 
confident about their influence on politics than White peers. Second, I raise the puzzle 
that while non-electoral participation is costlier than voting, Blacks and Latinos report 
being (or desiring to be) as involved or more than Whites, finding that risk acceptance 
emboldens minorities to report high participation and that the effect is strongest for 
Latinos without prior experience in the activities. Third, I establish with voter validation 
records that voting is also associated with risk attitudes but in the opposite direction – 
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risk averse, not risk accepting respondents were more likely to have voted. Risk 
acceptance yields Latino voting gaps with Whites, I observe, while the gaps are bridged 
with White peers under risk aversion. I also find that the relationship between risk 
attitudes and voting is conditional on campaign contact, as only contacted risk averse 
Latinos voted more than risk accepting counterparts. I conclude that mobilization efforts 
encouraging Latino voting may spend resources more efficiently by screening for risk 
attitudes, targeting the risk averse with traditional methods, and changing messaging for 
the risk accepting to loss-oriented frameworks. These findings suggest avenues for 
increasing the diversity of voices in civic and electoral arenas of democracy, as risk 
attitudes might be primed to supplement traditional forms of political mobilization. 
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Chapter 1: Scope of Project 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines how political participation is shaped by the avoidance 
and acceptance of risks (better known as “risk attitudes”). This relationship, I posit, 
influences minority political behavior as it helps to account for advantages, 
disadvantages, and lack of differences in engagement compared to the white majority. 
These findings are mostly specific to Latinos, with some explanatory power among 
Blacks, suggesting avenues for increasing the diversity of voices in civic and electoral 
arenas of democracy, as risk attitudes might be primed to supplement traditional forms of 
political mobilization. 
In deciding whether to take part in politics, scholars have long noted that 
individuals must first come to terms with the costs and benefits. Prior work on the 
calculus of voting posits that the costs of taking part are usually higher than the benefits 
one stands to gain. Voting can therefore be considered non-rational unless some aspect of 
duty or necessity intervenes to raise the stakes of inaction. The expectation of rationality 
carries over to participation in other non-electoral activities that are more involved and 
costlier than voting. These alternative political avenues present larger cost-to-benefit 
ratios suggesting participation is unlikely, but the logic is upended by non-white minority 
groups. Despite the fact that Blacks and Latinos are less likely to vote than whites, they 
are as likely or more to have been involved in and desire to be involved in costlier non-
electoral activities.  
The puzzle of minority participation can be a result of historical exclusion and 
present-day barriers to voting limiting non-whites as well as social movements supportive 
of their unconventional politics. And so non-white minorities may not perceive the same 
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costs to participation as White Americans, whose experiences inform what we know 
about political behavior. Political science is thus far missing a hypothesis of minority 
participation that accounts for the role of socialization into racial and ethnic identity in 
altering perceptions of costs of decision making. My contribution is recasting decisions to 
participate as a process where people apply subject weights to costs and benefits of 
participation that vary among groups of people, particularly racial and ethnic groups. 
Prospect theory provides that people assign unequal values to losses and gains presented 
by outcomes of activities and that those values are based on reference points. Here I 
demonstrate that racial and ethnic identities are reference points that shift perceptions of 
costs and benefits of involvement, encouraging some to shoulder expensive costs while 
others succumb to them and avoid activities. The result is an explanation of participatory 
behavior by non-white minorities that gives the appearance of being non-rational. 
This dissertation relies on evaluations of life’s uncertainties instead of 
calculations over costs and benefits of particular activities. In doing so, I advance that 
intended rationality and cognitive bias presented by prospect theory explain participatory 
behavior of non-whites. The broad schemas represent evaluations known as “risk 
attitudes,” describing whether the public is closed or open to new experiences that might 
provide better resources, living conditions, or new and exciting experiences. Prospect 
theory argues that risk attitudes are indicative of life experiences, such that risk aversion 
is prevalent but that people can accept risks under certain conditions. People avoid risks 
in the course of daily life because they seek to protect what they have achieved, grown 
comfortable with, or gained and favor slow, incremental gains. By contrast, experiencing 
losses, discomfort, or overall dissatisfaction is cause for a different course of action. Risk 
taking involves accepting the costs of losing when undertaking an activity involving 
uncertainty because people grow to value expected gains. So, links between risk attitudes 
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and political participation can reflect a translation of life conditions to political life: 
involvement by the risk averse would indicate that the public is motivated by 
preservation of current conditions and desire for steady change, whereas risk accepting 
individuals lean into participation head-first in pursuit of abrupt change, new experiences, 
and boldness.  
In my exploration of the effect of risk attitudes on non-electoral participation and 
the act of casting ballots, I uncover that the former is popular with the risk accepting and 
the latter with risk averse parts of the public. Racial and ethnic differences in the 
effectiveness of risk attitudes abound. Latinos (and Blacks on a smaller set of activities) 
that are risk accepting engaged in non-electoral politics more than White peers, while 
Latinos that are risk avoiding stayed home. Risk averse Latinos voted as much or more 
than similarly situated Whites. Risk accepting Latinos were much less likely to have 
voted than any other group, and I demonstrate that campaign contact was ineffective at 
encouraging their mobilization since they would rather be engaged in informal politics. 
The findings are empowered by three measures of risk attitudes -- Risk Propensity, Risk 
Orientation, and Risk Tolerance -- that capture avoidance or acceptance of risk on the 
domains of daily life activities, thrill or novelty seeking, and personal finances.  
The measures encompass characteristics or predispositions toward uncertainty 
that have developed as a result of long-term life conditions. Individuals learn about their 
environment and develop schemas about what costs are too much to bear and what is 
worthy of potential loss. My addition of measures of risk to standard models of 
participation help to explain divergence in participation among Blacks and Latinos 
compared to Whites, as well as conditions for their convergence. Relationships among 
risk and participation differ, too: risk acceptance is associated with non-electoral 
participation while risk aversion predicts voter turnout. Here, the political distinctiveness 
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of non-white minorities and Latinos in particular is explained by the measures of 
accumulated life experience: risk attitudes. In doing so, this dissertation explores a 
concept (risk) that has received relatively little attention from political scientists and tests 
how it can help understand (and under some conditions, ameliorate) the longstanding gap 
in participation by race and ethnicity. 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
This project contains four subsequent chapters. Chapter Two presents the 
emergence of risk attitudes from Prospect Theory and its contribution to understanding 
human behavior in the fields of finance, economics, and political science. In exploring 
frequencies, I observe little to no difference in risk attitudes among Whites, Blacks, and 
Latinos but identify differences in underpinnings relating to demographic, personality, 
and political efficacy dispositions. Specifically, I observe that risk is highest among 
Latinos disagreeing that “people like me can affect what government does” but agreeing 
that “officials care about people like me.” Differences are unique to Latinos, building the 
profile that risk accepting Latinos are more confident about their influence on individual 
officials than government itself. This finding contextualizes why risk accepting Latinos 
might be drawn to non-electoral politics more than White peers. 
Chapter Three presents survey evidence that acceptance of risks is associated with 
non-electoral participation, but among this group of the risk accepting Blacks and Latinos 
are more likely to participate than are Whites. Under risk aversion, non-electoral 
participation is less common but risk averse Whites are more likely to be engaged than 
similarly situated Blacks and Latinos. Models for desire to participate in the future also 
incorporate previous involvement. I determine that while risk was mobilizing for Whites 
that were previously involved, risk acceptance principally motivated Latinos with no 
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previous experience in non-electoral activities to desire to be involved. Findings suggest 
that risk acceptance can be drawn on to embolden inexperienced Latinos toward political 
movements and civic activities. 
Chapter Four employs validation data to test the effect of risk attitudes on 
propensities to vote, which I find are associated with risk aversion. On the low end of the 
risk attitudes spectrum, where the risk averse are contained, Latinos vote as much or 
more than do Whites but the divergence we see in national voting results occurs among 
the risk accepting. Here, my incorporation of mobilization contact by political campaigns 
to models of voting yields that risk-averse Latinos were the most receptive audience. 
Nearly all contacted Latinos reporting risk aversion are observed to have voted and, in 
many cases, more so than White peers. I conclude that voter mobilization messages prime 
concerns about certainty and careful gains compatible with risk aversion; thus, 
mobilization messages are ineffective among the risk accepting, who would rather engage 
in non-electoral politics. I recommend that mobilization initiatives for Latinos might 
employ resources more efficiently by (1) screening for risk attitudes and (2) 
administering loss-oriented messages to risk accepting Latinos while maintaining 
traditional methods with risk averse peers. 
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Chapter 2: Race, Ethnicity, and Measures of Risk 
INTRODUCTION 
Survey measures asking individuals about their willingness to undertake tasks 
with the possibilities of gains but also losses prompt a consideration of their orientations 
toward uncertainty. These measures capture “risk attitudes,” detailing whether and to 
what degree one might put at stake current conditions for the possibility of new 
outcomes. Rejection of risk is most common, prospect theory explains, as a matter of 
cognitive bias due to our perception that “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman 
2013). This uneven distribution of risk attitudes is consequential to political science 
because the public engages in non-rational, non-utility maximizing participatory behavior 
that is correlated with risk attitudes. And yet, the size of those correlations is not equal for 
respondents of diverse backgrounds compared to the majority, White Americans. So 
conventionally unseen factors are at play encouraging some over others to be more or less 
involved in politics than average at specific levels of risk attitudes. In this chapter, I show 
that risk attitudes that are similar across the population vary in their demographic 
correlates by racial-ethnic subgroup, leading to differences in efficacy that in turn explain 
differences in political behavior. 
My analysis focuses on the formation of risk attitudes based on defining 
characteristics, like gender, age, education, and income, that shape socialization 
experiences for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. We know that minority populations are 
more female, younger in age, and lower education and income compared to Whites; these 
factors also predispose the population at large to certain levels of risk. Women and the 
elderly opt for much less risk, while those with high education and income find 
themselves willing to accept more risk. For Blacks and Latinos, low education, low 
 7 
income, and higher percentages of women are predispositions for risk aversion, while 
younger average age are predispositions for risk acceptance. On the whole, these factors 
predispose minorities toward risk aversion, yet Black and Latino risk attitudes are the 
same as those of Whites. This empirical puzzle raises the question: Do the influences of 
specific defining characteristics of risk attitudes differ for minority populations compared 
to Whites? And are the defining characteristics those that might influence participatory 
behavior like non-electoral participation or voting itself? 
One example could be that although low income and education predispose Blacks 
and Latinos to risk aversion, the groups’ young age plays a bigger role that it does for 
Whites in encouraging risk acceptance. Old age could also disproportionately shape 
Black and Latino risk aversion, and since older age is associated with voting, Black and 
Latino risk aversion could explain their higher levels of voting compared to Whites. In 
this manner it is possible to determine important differences in risk attitude formation 
despite aggregate similarities. Comparisons of risk attitudes without close inspection of 
key correlates would have us believe that the roots of economic, social, and political 
disadvantages endemic to minority groups today are lost when determining whether to 
avoid or accept risks that might provide better living standards or new experiences. In 
what follows, I present evidence that the influence of these backgrounds remains when 
minorities form attitudes towards risk. In doing so, I argue that the concept of risk 
attitudes with origins in behavioral economics is a vessel for experiences of socialization 
previously explained as mere artifacts of racial and ethnic identity. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Riskiness was frowned upon in ancient times. The will of the gods determined 
everything and tempting it by seeking new fortunes was the main way of angering the 
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gods (Bernstein 1996). Societal shifts toward monotheism did little to abate concerns 
about questioning fate well into the medieval age, so little was known about risk-taking 
behavior until the enlightenment of the 18th century (Biagini and Schlesinger 2013). 
With Daniel Bernoulli’s utility theory, we understood that decision making in 
transactional situations is motivated by the highest utility, or satisfaction. Its assumption 
is that everyone maintains preferences that are ranked from first to last, which are known 
or complete, and consistent across decision scenarios. In a marketplace, the buyer seeks 
to acquire the goods and services that provide the most satisfaction confined by resources 
that buyers are able to spend and prices set by sellers. In investing, rational decision-
making also encourages high risks to receive high rewards but the utility of risks 
diminishes once costs appear to outweigh the benefits and the stakes of losing get too 
high (Aleskerov and Monjardet 2002). This point of saturation dictates that risk aversion 
kicks in and becomes a rational strategy because opportunities for additional risk are 
unreasonable temptations of fate. 
Utility theory’s contributions of the prevalence and underpinnings of risk aversion 
were revised in the 20th century when it was clear that observations were inconsistent 
with expectations. Specifically, rationally-driven individuals geared toward maximization 
ought to downshift to risk aversion once the utility of particular risks becomes negative, 
offering losses rather than gains. Instead, Rabin (2000) observed that when this utility is 
non-negative and outcomes are left to chance with a 50% probability of winning and 50% 
probability of losing, most individuals refused possibilities to win $110 while risking 
$100 and refused the possibility of winning any sum of money while risking $1,000. 
Under utility theory, the acceptance of high risk for high rewards should have been 
dominant but participants in these behavioral experiments opted to avoid all risk. This 
implication is important because decision makers are now shown to irrationally avoid 
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risks that might help in getting ahead or making other related decisions. Risk aversion in 
this sense was prevalent but its origins and implications were unknown. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory revisited utility theory’s 
assumptions to explain irrational behavior with evidence from behavioral economics, 
making it a descriptive model tied to real life decisions instead of theorized optimal 
outcomes. Prospect theory shows that we make decisions in scenarios that involve 
uncertainty by assigning subjective values to potential losses and gains rather than simply 
considering which provides the most worth. The assigned values are unequal because we 
tend to experience losses as more severe than equivalent gains. Origins of risk aversion 
trace back to early development as humans learned to weigh losses larger than gains for 
the sake of survival, hardwiring risk aversion into human cognition (Kahneman 2013, p. 
282). Conclusions like “losses loom larger than gains” and “people are loss averse” are 
staples of prospect theory. 
 
Illustration 1: S-curve value function 
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Illustration 2: S-curve value function with monetary values 
Prospect theory’s s-curve value function is contained in Illustration 1 
demonstrating this logic as the value of outcomes differs whether possible choices reside 
in domains of losses or gains (represented by values on the y-axis). The slope of the value 
function is steeper when x-axis values are negative versus positive ones. An adaptation in 
Illustration 2 with cents demonstrates that value we might assign to the loss of $.05 over 
twice as much as the value we would assign to the possibility of gaining $.05. This 
theoretical representation captures the quandary raised by utility theory as well as the 
tendency toward aversion of potential risk of loss despite outcomes having the same 
value.  
We assign value to gains and losses with heuristics known as reference points 
prior to making decisions. The illustrations above contain reference points as the y-axis 
determining the slope of the value function curve as potential outcomes range from 
negative to positive values. The assigning period is an editing phase as our preferred 
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outcomes are sorted, equivalent ones combined, and the possibilities get ranked based on 
which is lesser or greater based on some salient point of comparison (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992). This process is analogous to utility theory’s theorized phase of the 
sorting of preferences for highest value but prospect theory does not require or suggest 
that preferences are fully formed, completely known, or accurately sorted. Instead, people 
make decisions with impressions based on limited information at hand with an eye 
toward selecting the best option (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). So we intend to be 
rational but our abilities are limited and motivations that moderate utility maximization 
may differ by individual.  
One example is the factor of wealth that can motivate someone with little to lose 
to strongly favor taking a risk, while someone else may strongly prefer to avoid risk to 
protect current wealth. Such a reference point and others provide different propensities 
toward risk because they determine whether individuals approach problems from 
domains (or frames) of gains versus losses. This process advances that individuals frame 
problems by encoding possible outcomes and deciding the option that yields the most 
benefits, while weighing gains and losses unequally. Prospect theory determined this 
tendency with the discovery that preferred strategies to problems could be manipulated 
based on how they are framed. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) developed prospect theory 
with a series of framing experiments that yielded unusual switching in courses of action 
when frames of the same problem shifted. One example is that of their well-known 
experiment tasking participants to consider a hypothetical outbreak of a contagious 
foreign disease in the U.S. where 600 people would die. 
Participants were to decide what program for dealing with the disease to 
implement in two waves. The first wave offered that (Program A) 200 people would live 
with the unmentioned implication that 400 people would die or (Program B) one-third 
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chance that all 600 people would live but two-third chance that no one would be saved. 
Both options were presented in positive framing emphasizing survivability of people 
while retaining the same expected utility. Specifically, saving 200 people is worth the 
same as a one-third chance of saving all 600 (1/3*600=200). 72% percent of participants 
opted for the certainty of gains, or risk aversion offered by Program A despite both 
programs being equal in outcomes. Utility theory leads us to conclude that the problem’s 
description should not influence the choice people make but this is not the case. In effect, 
people are observed to have assigned unequal values to options presented and opted for 
certain conditions that provided the clearest path toward gains. 
Risk aversion is found to be predominant but not resolute with support for 
Program A dropping to 22% when its presentation changed. The experiment altered 
Program A to emphasize the negative aspects unmentioned in the survival frame above. 
In this new scheme, participants were to pick that (Program A) 400 people would die 
with the unmentioned implication that 200 would be saved or (Program B) a one-third 
chance that no one would die but a two-thirds chance that 600 people would die. The 
expected utility between the two options was also similar with 400 dying equaling a two-
thirds chance of 600 dying (2/3*600=400). The majority choice in this mortality frame 
was Program B where participants were emboldened to accept risk because it provided 
the clearest option to avoid loss. This altered frame brought to the fore that reference 
points will change decisions, and this finding is known as the “reflective effect.” 
Specifically, distaste for loss is fundamental as people respond to experiencing downsides 
by accepting risk. Risk is avoided in a domain of gains because opting for certainty is the 
safest route to preserve current conditions. That risk aversion is so prevalent implies that 
the public mostly finds itself in a domain of gains. Here, understanding reference points 
is critical to learning about decision making when risk is involved. 
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Wealth is an important example because losses and gains brought on by options 
usually involve resources but other relevant points for decisions in domains economic or 
otherwise are unspecified by prospect theory. Decisions between scenarios involving 
uncertainty can be based on not one but an amalgamation of reference points that inform 
life goals or aspirations shaping perceptions of losses and gains (van Osch et al. 2006). 
Reference points can also form around awareness attained from external sources and their 
effect can differ the more people become accustomed to uncertainty of repeated tasks 
(Schwartz and Goldberg 2008; Kahneman 2013). And yet, despite their prominence, the 
identification of reference points will be incomplete at best. Data may assist with 
reducing factors that matter the most for the possibility of explaining risk-taking behavior 
as a function of a limited predictors. With social surveys, identification of factors serving 
as reference points also makes it possible to test for differences in magnitude of effects of 
reference points on risk attitudes across subpopulations of respondents. Social surveys 
contain measures of risk asking respondents to report how much risk they might be 
willing to accept given particular situations. The measures represent attitudes toward 
situations involving uncertainty, so I will refer to them as “risk attitudes.” 
Tests yield that age and gender (female) are reference points with bearings on risk 
attitudes. In general, it is observed that people that are young in age and male see 
increased willingness to accept risk than do women and those who are older (Kam 2012). 
The characteristics of age and gender capture differential assignment of the values of 
losses and gains when facing real-world problems. Specifically, men and young adults 
assign lower values to potential losses and higher value to potential gains compared to 
women and older adults. The result is lesser risk aversion and more risk acceptance. The 
literature also finds that ideology and education are meaningful predictors of risk 
 14 
attitudes. Liberals and more educated people report greater instances of risk taking than 
do conservatives and the less educated (Yao et al. 2005; Kam and Simas 2010).  
All told, the evidence points to measures of risk being tethered to aspects of real 
life. The reference points age, gender, education, and ideology emerge as lenses that filter 
outcomes of solutions to problems presented by risk measures. While some find it 
prudent to value losses greater than gains and avoid risks, others place less value on 
losses and greater value on gains to accept risks. Differences in attitudes toward risk 
based on these characteristics also affirm prospect theory’s improvement of utility theory 
that people wield subjective values rather than concerns for absolute worth of solutions to 
problems. 
Do individuals at the intersection of the identified predictors (or reference points) 
of attitudes toward risk display mixed strategies for dealing with uncertainty? Racial and 
ethnic minority identification is an example of how socialization to life conditions 
approaches toward risk differently from the White majority. An initial consideration is 
that Blacks and Latinos are generally younger in age and more liberal than Whites 
(Abrajano and Alvarez 2010) so they might exhibit greater than average risk acceptance. 
And yet Blacks and Latinos are also less educated than Whites and the Black female-
male ratio is skewed toward Black females (ibid; AJ 2008). These conditions ought to 
yield lower than average acceptance of risk or more risk aversion for Blacks and Latinos 
compared to Whites.  
Resulting profiles of risk attitudes would be a toss-up if it were not for literature 
noting that minority identity is associated with increased risk behavior as distinct from 
attitudes. An initial assessment of risk attitudes using surveys of Americans showed 
racial-ethnic differences, with Black, Latino, Asian, and American Indian respondents 
more willing than Whites to undertake financial risk (Barsky et al. 1997). In 
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randomization experiments, Latinos also emerged as more risk accepting than Whites 
when it came to risking existing gains in pursuit of potentially higher outcomes (Cox and 
Harrison 2008). In other settings, Blacks accepted 1.3 times and Latinos 1.4 times more 
substantial financial risk than did Whites, while both were less willing to take “some 
financial risk.” One explanation is that high risk is a feature of catching-up in terms of 
living conditions and low socioeconomic status, leaving many with little to lose. More 
dubiously, “Machismo” is advanced as a cultural explanation for bravado encouraging 
assertiveness and discouraging signs of weakness among Latino men (Yao et al. 2005). 
Differences in underpinnings that might see minorities subjectively reject or accept risk 
are thus far untested so answers are not clear. Do reference points explaining risk for 
Blacks and Latinos differ compared to Whites? Answering this question is the focus of 
this chapter. 
Why does it matter that the differences in risk presented by predictors could differ 
by race and ethnic group? It matters because, as this chapter will show, the reference 
points differ for minority groups compared to Whites and the experiences represented 
might expand on different modes of socialization rather than just respondents being of 
Latino, Black, or White descent. Difference in rationales over refusing or accepting risk 
uncovered here will contextualize disproportionate effects of risk on political engagement 
for the racial and ethnic groups in subsequent chapters. I expect as much, because 
minorities already exhibit slight dispositions toward risk acceptance. Since, for example, 
risk is positively associated with non-electoral participation (Kam 2012), this could lead 
to higher participation for non-White minorities. 
 16 
MEASUREMENTS 
Risk attitudes are a conceptualization of prospect theory and measured of the 
public using survey instruments that emerged from different disciplines. Measures of risk 
attitudes are known to be highly heterogeneous of one another so I rely on multiple 
constructs (Ding et al. 2010), endeavoring to include as many as available for a 
multipronged perspective on the relationships respondents maintain with life’s 
uncertainties in different domains. I rely on the public release of the 2008-09 ANES 
Panel Study that contains three measures of risk attitudes, the most available in one 
dataset that also contains measures of political participation. In no particular order, the 
first is the Risk Propensity Scale, which queries respondents about their willingness 
toward uncertainty on quality of life or living standard issues like taking risks on one’s 
health. Second, the Risk Orientation Scale is more concerned with proclivity toward 
novelty or sensation seeking behavior like betting on sports or a sense of adventure. Third 
is the Risk Tolerance Scale that gauges respondent willingness to accept risk after being 
presented a hypothetical scenario where a new job offers double the income but a risk of 
loss of certain shares of current income. Risk thresholds change and respondents are to 
report whether they would leave their current job for the prospect of the new one. I 
describe the risk attitudes measures in detail below. 
The Risk Personality Scale (RPS) 
An initial measure of risk attitudes that range from aversion through increased 
degrees of acceptance is the Risk Propensity Scale (RPS). The measure is composed of 
an index of items measuring risk-taking tendencies, providing adequate internal validity 
while maintaining low correlations with other measures. It is able to do so because it 
steps away from self-reported propensities to engage in risk-taking behavior such as thrill 
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or sensation seeking. Examples include participating in high-risk sports of other 
behaviors that might involve violating social norms, for which risk appears to be a 
byproduct of participation (Meertens et al. 2008). Component parts for the measure are 
available in Wave 15 of the 2008-09 ANES Panel that was fielded in March 2009. The 
Great Recession was underway so the survey module (sponsored by the Rockefeller 
Foundation) focused on polling about economic worries and shocks, financial buffers, 
and government policies for aiding those in need. The RPS’s focus on risk attitudes in 
living conditions enables it to explain, for example, disproportionate concerns about well-
being after financial setbacks, perceptions of economic buffers, and desires for risk 
buffering government interventions (Hacker et al. 2010a; 2010b; 2013). 
Table 1: Risk Propensity Scale: Non-Financial Risk Aversion to Risk Acceptance 
Item Question Text Sample White Black Latino Asian 
Prompt: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about how you view life’s uncertainties. Please do not think 
too long before answering; usually your first inclination is the best one.” 
1 Safety first:  
Totally Agree (0) to Totally Disagree (1); 7 categories 
.25 .25 .21 .28 .22 
2 I do not take risks with my health:  
Totally Agree (0) to Totally Disagree (1); 7 categories 
.34 .35 .32 .34 .28 
3 I prefer to avoid risks:  
Totally Agree (0) to Totally Disagree (1); 7 categories 
.39 .39 .35 .44 .39 
4 I take risks regularly:  
Totally Disagree (0) to Total Agree (1); 7 categories 
.36 .36 .35 .39 .41 
5 I really dislike not knowing what is going to 
happen: Totally Agree (0) to Totally Disagree (1); 7 categories 
.36 .36 .35 .37 .38 
6 I usually view risks as a challenge:  
Totally Agree (0) to Totally Disagree (1); 7 categories 
.53 .53 .53 .49 .51 
7 “I view myself as….”:  
Risk Avoider (0) to Risk Seeker (1); 7 categories 
.36 .37 .32 .39 .40 
 Overall Index Mean .37 .37 .34 .39 .37 
 Cronbach's α .73 .73 .72 .75 .69 
 Observations 2491 2088 198 109 96 
 Weighed Observations 249.77 1911.43 299.91 188.29 91.14 
Note: Table entry is weighted sample mean of observations from Wave 15 (cross sectional weight) of the 2008-09 ANES Panel. Subgroup 
entries are derived by Taylor Series estimation using STATA’s “svy” procedure for survey data. 
Respondents were asked to agree or disagree, via a 7-point scale, with statements 
regarding generalized versions of risk. The instructions requested, “Please do not think 
too long before answering, usually your first inclination is the best one.” Statements read, 
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“Safety first,” “I do not take risks with my health,” “I prefer to avoid risks,” “I take risks 
regularly,” “I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen,” “I view risks as a 
challenge,” and “I view myself as a Risk Avoider-Seeker.” I recoded the response 
categories to indicate risk acceptance as the higher values and the variable to range 
between 0 and 1 for whether means fall above or below the midpoint of .5. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1.  
The 2,491 respondents reported, on average, mild disagreement with believing 
safety first, not taking health risks, avoiding risks, not taking risks regularly, liking not 
knowing what is going to happen, and seeing oneself as a complete risk avoider. 
Although these disagreements might indicate risk acceptance, it is a mild form that falls 
below the midpoint of .5, indicating that on average the public’s response was closer to 
risk aversion than risk acceptance. A finding that is an exception is whether one views 
risks as a challenge. Respondents moderately disagreed, and responses emerged to the 
right side of .5, indicating that the public is capable of accepting or undertaking risks but 
generally chooses not to do so in the other items. This measure is aggregated with the 
others to comprise the RPS.  
The decision to accept mild forms of risk is also stable. First, an aggregation of all 
the items yields a mean of .37 with an alpha reliability score of .73, which is well above 
the informal threshold of .60. Second, means and reliability scores are without 
statistically significant differences across racial and ethnic groups. Overall means for 
Whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Other non-Whites range between mid to high .3 while scales 
are reliable at a rate from low to mid .70. Observed means communicate that the public, 
regardless of race-ethnicity, is closer to risk aversion than to complete risk acceptance. 
Third, stability across race and ethnicity holds despite differences in observation counts. 
Whites composed a total of 2,088 interviewees, Blacks 198, Latinos 109, and Other non-
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Whites 69. Sampling weight adjustments enable me to generalize population wide, as 
observations increased among Blacks to 300, Latinos to 188, and Other non-Whites to 91. 
 
 
Graph 1: RPS – Risk Propensity Scale distributions by Race, Ethnicity 
Distributions for RPS are contained in Graph 1, which lean mostly to the left as 
respondent representation at the higher end is less numerous. In some cases toward the 
end of the spectrum, observations are so few that they do not register on the bar graph. 
The “Aggregate” cell of Graph 1 presents the RPS distribution for all respondents that is 
then subdivided by race and ethnicity. Due to the large numerical representation of 
Whites, their distribution is closest to the Aggregate by visual inspection, while 
representation at maximum values is extremely low. Cells for Blacks and Latinos look 
slightly different owing to limited representation in the survey. Bars are thicker because 
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proportional responses are fewer and it is apparent that no Black or Latino registered as 
completely risk accepting (value of 1) in the RPS. Minority group observations are also 
few in number above the .5 midpoint. It might be difficult to determine the effect of risk 
acceptance on political participation if a very limited set of respondents are responsible 
for representing extreme risk-accepting views among the minority groups. 
The Risk Orientation Scale (ROS) 
Measures of Risk Orientation are also found in the 2008 ANES in Wave 22 that 
was fielded in October 2009. Seven individual survey items composing the Risk 
Orientation Scale (ROS) asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
statements: (1) you will never achieve much in life unless you act boldly; (2) continue 
playing if you won big on horse betting; (3) would like to explore strange places; (4) like 
to do frightening things; (5) like new and exciting experiences; (6) prefer friends who are 
exciting and unpredictable; and (7) find it very easy to accept taking risks. 
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Table 2: Risk Orientation: Lifestyle Risk Aversion to Risk Acceptance 
Item Question Text Sample White Black Latino Asian 
1 Some people say you should be cautious about making 
major changes in life. Suppose these people are located at 
1. Others say that you will never achieve much in life 
unless you act boldly. Suppose these people are located at 
7. And others have views in between. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale? (Scale recoded to range between 0 
and 1) 
.57 .56 .64 .56 .57 
2 Suppose you were betting on horses and were a big winner 
in the 3rd or 4th race. Would you be more likely to continue 
playing or take your winnings? Definitely continue playing (0) to 
Definitely take my winnings (1) 
.28 .29 .24 .27 .28 
3 I would like to explore strange places:  
Strongly Disagree (0) to Strongly Agree (1); 5 categories 
.67 .67 .63 .69 .68 
4 I like to do frightening things:  
Strongly Disagree (0) to Strongly Agree (1); 5 categories 
.34 .34 .30 .39 .39 
5 I like new and exciting experiences, even if I have to break 
the rules: 
Strongly Disagree (0) to Strongly Agree (1); 5 categories 
.41 .41 .34 .46 .46 
6 I prefer friends who are exciting and unpredictable:  
Strongly Disagree (0) to Strongly Agree (1); 5 categories 
.48 .48 .49 .47 .50 
7 In general, how easy or difficult is it for you to accept 
taking risks? 
Very difficult (0) to Very easy (1); 4 categories 
.45 .45 .39 .48 .51 
 Overall Index Mean .46 .46 .43 .47 .48 
 Cronbach's α .71 .71 .71 .69 .70 
 Observations 2266 1883 187 111 85 
 Weighed Observations 2266 1747.76 268.03 167.10 83.11 
Note: Table entry is weighted sample mean of observations from Wave 22 (cross sectional weight) of the 2008-09 ANES Panel. Subgroup entries are 
derived by Taylor Series estimation using STATA’s “svy” procedure for survey data. 
Table 2 contains measures for responses to the above questions ranging between 0 
and 1. The means for the majority of responses fall to the right of the midpoint, so are 
generally closer to little or moderate risk rather than high risk acceptance. The table also 
includes two exceptions - respondents recognize they mostly have to act boldly to 
achieve much in life and express desire to explore strange places. As with the RPS, the 
public appears ready and willing to accept risks but prefers to avoid it in practice. The 
ROS was similarly proposed as an improvement over questions asking about sensory 
stimulating but it maintains a focus on novelty seeking behavior here (Ehrlich and 
Maestas 2010). Overall, indexed items yield a mean of .46, which is not above the 
midpoint of .5 and signals a less than moderate risk acceptance, with a reliability score of 
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.71. The scale is similarly stable across race and ethnicity, as mean values stay within the 
mid .4 range and reliability scores are similar to the measure in the aggregate, at or near 
.70. 
 
Graph 2: ROS – Risk Orientation Scale distributions by Race, Ethnicity 
Graph 2 displays observational distributions of the ROS. As with the RPS, the 
majority of observations remain to the left of the midpoint, showing that the public is 
mostly focused on avoiding risks. For minorities, cells of the ROS also show that few to 
no observations at the higher end remains an issue (as with the RPS) so extrapolation 
from higher values of risk might be limited. The RPS and ROS are roughly similar as 
they indicate that the public generally plays it safe by preferring to avoid major risks. 
And yet, the tables above contain evidence of the public’s willingness to accept risks if 
and when it is called for by situations. A principal mechanism is finding oneself in a 
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domain of losses in relation to the status quo, which encourages pursuit of excitement or 
lost resources. Both scales also exhibit stability across groups of respondents in means 
and reliability scores. 
The Risk Tolerance Scale (RTS) 
The use of the Risk Tolerance Scale (RTS) in political analysis has revealed that 
cognitive biases for rejecting and accepting risk are formative to policy opinions and 
voting behavior. Specifically, risk accepting individuals support uncertain policies like 
military intervention. Experiment interventions priming respondents about the uncertain 
nature of policies stiffened opposition by the risk averse while increasing it among the 
risk accepting. Eckles and Scaffner (2011) concluded that policy framing ought to 
consider the public’s relationships with uncertainty. Another example finds that risk 
attitudes measured by the RTS also shape which candidates voters prefer in congressional 
elections. Incumbents that promote their achievements in Congress, for example, will ask 
voters to be sent back to continue their hard work for constituents. Challengers to 
incumbents most certainly offer different approaches to government from incumbents and 
ask voters to take a chance on them in exchange for potential benefits down the road. 
Risk averse voters therefore favor incumbents while the risk accepting support 
challengers, independent of mitigating demographic and political factors (Eckles et al. 
2014). The finding indicates that tendencies for risk are linked to voting choices, while a 
link between risk and voting participation remains unestablished and a focus of Chapter 
Four. 
Risk Tolerance measures one’s propensity to tolerate risk in the domain of 
personal finances as respondents are tasked with accepting or rejecting jobs that might 
offer double income in exchange for the risk of losing current levels of income. The 
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survey instrument adjusted thresholds of the hazard for income that might be lost as 
respondent increased levels of risk. The measure uses a branching questions scheme, and 
its initial question asks: 
“Suppose you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a 
good job guaranteed to give you income every year for life. You are 
given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 
chance it will double your income and a 50-50 chance it will cut it your 
income by a third. Would you take the new job?”  
Respondents are offered the options “Yes” or “No.” If No, the survey presents the 
following: “Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your income, and 50-50 
that it would cut it by 20 percent.” This second question is for respondents that turned 
down the initial offer, testing if a lower level of risk is more tolerable. Saying “No” to 
this second offer provides the observation of “Least Risk Tolerant” with 0% risk accepted 
and is coded as 0. Turning down the initial offer (saying “No”) but accepting the second 
(then saying “Yes”) leads to a coding of “Somewhat Risk Tolerant.” 
 Those respondents that accepted the initial offer of risking a third of their 
income are then asked an additional question that increases the hazard threshold: 
“Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your income, and a 50-50 chance 
that it would cut it in half. Would you still take the new job?” Turning down this second 
offer after accepting the initial one (saying “Yes” then “No”) provides the observation 
that respondents seeking to double existing earnings are tolerant of the risk of losing 
33.3% of income but 50% is too much. Respondents are coded as “Moderately Risk 
Tolerant” when willing to risk 33.3% of their personal income. Respondents accepting 
both offers (saying “Yes” then saying “Yes”) provides the observation of “Most Risk 
Tolerant” (coded with a value of 1) as respondents are willing to risk 50% of current 
earnings for the shot at doubling that income. 
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Table 3: Risk Tolerance Scale: Financial Risk Aversion to Risk Acceptance 
Code Question Text Sample White Black Latino Asian 
Prompt: “Suppose you had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your current total income. And that job 
was (you/your family’s) only source of income. Then you are given the opportunity to take a new, and equally good, 
job with a 50-50 chance that it will double your income and spending power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut 
your income and spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?” (Yes/No); If yes: “Now, suppose the 
chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family income), and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. Would 
you still take this job?” (Yes/No); If No: “Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your 
(family income), and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20%. Would you still take this job? (Yes/No); If Yes-Yes: “Now, 
suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job would double your (family income), and 50-50 that it would cut it by 
75%. Would you still take this job?” (Yes/No); If No-No: “Now, suppose the chances were 50-50 that the new job 
would double your (family income), and 50-50 that it would cut it by 10%. Would you still take this job? (Yes/No) 
0 Refuse:  
Reject “a third” & Reject “by 20%” & Reject “by 10%” 
.25 .25 .32 .21 .19 
.20 Accept 10%:  
Reject “a third” & Reject “by 20%” & Accept “by 10%” 
.20 .21 .15 .15 .15 
.40 Accept 20%:  
Reject “a third” & Accept “by 20%” 
.23 .24 .16 .27 .13 
.60 Accept 33.3%:  
Accept “a third” & Reject “in half” 
.13 .12 .09 .20 .26 
.80 Accept 50%:  
Accept “a third” & Accept “in half” & Reject “by 75%” 
.13 .13 .13 .15 .14 
1 Accept 75%:  
Accept “a third” & Accept “in half” & Accept “by 75%” 













 Observations 2491 2088 198 109 96 
 Weighed Observations 249.78 1911.43 299.91 188.29 91.14 
Note: Table entry is weighted sample mean of observations from Wave 15 (cross sectional weight) of the 2008-09 ANES Panel. Subgroup entries are 
derived by Taylor Series estimation using STATA’s “svy” procedure for survey data. 
Table 3 contains distributions for the Risk Tolerance branching questions and 
coding scheme. For each column, proportions dividing the survey population and 
subpopulations by racial/ethnic identity are presented. Entries denote what share of 
specific groups compose a particular RTS threshold to see what share of group members 
inhabit particular categories. The variable means present the average of responses on a 
scale between 0 and 1 indicating degrees of risk that respondents accepted in the RTS. 
The mean for the sample at-large is to the right of the midpoint of .5 at .38 
indicating that the public continues to favor risk aversion in this scenario involving 
income. Whites report slightly higher means than do Blacks (.41), Latinos (.41), and 
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other non-Whites (.48). The averages indicate that minorities are potentially willing to 
accept more risk in scenarios involving income, though all statistics are to the right of the 
midpoint so risk aversion continues to dominate to some degree. Reported proportional 
scores show that among the highest risk taking were Blacks at 16%. Latinos outnumbered 
all else in the willingness to accept both a 20% and 33.3% risk of current income. 
Responses for White respondents varied less as they were clustered in the lower region 
indicating risk aversion. Graph 3 displays distributions of proportions presented above in 
percentages. 
 
Graph 3: RTS – Risk Tolerance Scale distributions by Race, Ethnicity 
The following are models of RPS, ROS, and RTS in order to test which factors 
determine risk attitudes. Models are advanced in phases with different sets of predictors 
to capture potentially significant factors in addition to standard sets of predictions. The 
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first phase tests an assortment of standard predictors like demographics. Subsequent 
phases add personality characteristics (phase 2), measures of political awareness and 
efficacy (phase 3), and senses of economic well-being (phase 4). Additional models test 
for variations in determinants by race and ethnicity. 
FINDINGS 
Tabulations of risk measures in the 2008-09 ANES show no major differences in 
refusal or acceptance for Blacks and Latinos compared to Whites. This presents an 
empirical puzzle because the minority groups differ in the same characteristics that 
predispose the public to be less or more comfortable with risk. Blacks and Latinos are 
younger and more liberal than Whites and ought to express higher risk acceptance. The 
groups are also less educated, and women are a greater share of the Black population, so 
these measures should push minorities in a more risk averse direction in comparison to 
Whites. That differences in risk are not apparent in comparisons of mean values indicates 
that particular underpinnings might be performing outsized roles in suppressing or 
uplifting risk. In other words, Black and Latino risk strategies are not dissimilar from 
Whites’ when they should be, which suggests the groups might be relying on alternative 
reference points that result in parity. Identification of those influences will be useful later, 
as contextualizing risk is found to provide large benefits for minority political 
participation but comparably smaller gains for that of Whites. 
Demographic Predictors of Risk Attitudes 
An initial step is to determine what factors exert statistically significant effects on 
measures of risk attitudes. The significant predictors can be thought of as reference points 
since they yield differences in risk strategies, like the frames in the contagious disease 
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experiment. Their value is in capturing how respondents came to highly value potential 
losses and therefore avoided risk or placed greater weight on potential gains before they 
were willing to accept risk. Table 4 contains linear regression models with predictors 
explaining distributions of RPS, ROS, and RTS measures for risk attitudes. Columns 
labeled “Model 1” for each dependent variable contain estimates for standard additive 
models that show the effects of variables with all others held constant. 
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Table 4: Demographic Predictors of Risk Attitudes, Linear Regression Estimates 
 Risk Propensity Scale Risk Orientation Scale Risk Tolerance Scale 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Black -.09 (.11) -.52 (.53) -.00 (.06) .23 (.30) .24 (.20) 1.05 (1.01) 
Latino .05 (.13) .61 (.55) -.02 (.09) -.40 (.27) .10 (.18) .15 (.82) 
Other -.03 (.14) -.11 (.56) .03 (.10) .45 (.45) .43 (.27) .66 (1.20) 
Income -.00 (.02) .00 (.02) .03* (.01) .02 (.01) -.02 (.04) -.03 (.04) 
Age -.10*** (.02) -.10*** (.02) -.10*** (.01) -.11*** (.02) -.13*** (.04) -.11** (.04) 
Black # Age   .14+ (.08)   .05 (.05)   -.04 (.16) 
Latino # Age   -.07 (.09)   .05 (.08)   -.07 (.13) 
Other # Age   -.16 (.11)   -.14* (.07)   -.21 (.18) 
Income -.00 (.02) .00 (.02) .03* (.01) .02 (.01) -.02 (.04) -.03 (.04) 
Black # Income   -.08 (.09)   -.06 (.05)   -.07 (.16) 
Latino # Income   -.07 (.10)   .11* (.06)   .11 (.14) 
Other # Income   .10 (.10)   .11+ (.06)   .23 (.19) 
Education .06* (.03) .05+ (.03) .03 (.02) .04* (.02) .10* (.05) .11* (.05) 
Black # Education   .17 (.11)   -.02 (.06)   .03 (.20) 
Latino # Education   -.04 (.14)   -.10 (.10)   .13 (.20) 
Other # Education   -.03 (.12)   -.13 (.09)   -.37 (.30) 
Female -.35*** (.05)  -.35*** (.05)  -.17*** (.03) -.17*** (.03) -.32*** (.09) -.28** (.09) 
Black # Female   -.04 (.24)   -.10 (.13)   -.36 (.40) 
Latino # Female   .24 (.25)   .19 (.15)   -.21 (.37) 
Other # Female   -.25 (.23)   -.27 (.19)   .05 (.45) 
Foreign Born -.24* (.11)  -.19+ (.11) -.05 (.10)  -.01 (.10) .08 (.21)  .16 (.29) 
Black # Foreign Born   -.41 (.26)   -.12 (.46)   -.66 (.65) 
Latino # Foreign Born   .22 (.31)   .17 (.16)   .07 (.56) 
Other # Foreign Born   -.06 (.26)   -.08 (.24)   -.30 (.53) 
Party ID .01 (.02) .02 (.02) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) 
Black # Party ID   -.02 (.10)   -.00 (.04)   .06 (.13) 
Latino # Party ID   -.06 (.10)   -.02 (.07)   -.04 (.13) 
Other # Party ID   -.07 (.16)   .01 (.07)   -.09 (.17) 
Ideology -.02 (.02) -.02 (.02) -.04** (.01) -.04* (.02) .04 (.05) .06 (.05) 
Black # Ideology   .01 (.10)   -.03 (.05)   -.12 (.17) 
Latino # Ideology   -.02 (.10)   .00 (.06)   -.06 (.16) 
Other # Ideology   .13 (.12)   -.01 (.07)   .15 (.22) 
Constant 3.88*** (.17) 3.61*** (.15) 3.67*** (.14) 3.63*** (.10) 3.04*** (.33) 3.02*** (.27) 
F-Statistic 7.33*** 3.36*** 12.33*** 5.29*** 3.68*** 1.60*** 
Observations 2491 2491 2266 2266 2491 2491 
Linear regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study. Weighted analysis of 
multiply imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variables are scales of risk attitudes measures presented above. + p < .10, * p < 
.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
In Table 4, we see several common trends and some unique observations about 
explanations for risk attitudes. Age and gender (female) are consistently associated with 
lower than average risk acceptance in the RPS, ROS, and RTS models. Younger adults 
and male respondents are more emboldened to accept risk and appear to prefer potential 
gains over potential losses. The results are consistent with the literature. Another 
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commonality includes education, as respondents to the RPS and RTS with high education 
were more risk accepting than were low education counterparts. In contrast to the ROS 
measure, the RPS and RTS variables are closely linked to experiences relating to risk in 
daily life, and education provides familiarity with navigating their complexities. It would 
therefore make sense that the least educated would feel high uncertainty and express low 
risk acceptance compared to the more educated, who have a more expanded 
understanding about life. Income has a similar effect in the ROS model. 
Other unique, model-specific observations are apparent. Being foreign born is 
negatively associated with low risk acceptance in the RPS model, as immigrants are 
apparently more careful about their life decisions compared to the native born. Ideology 
is also negatively associated with ROS as conservatives are less risk accepting than are 
liberals on the measure emphasizing novelty and pursuance of new experiences. In 
general, additive models show that risk attitudes are connected to life situations whereby 
some are freer than others to pursue experiences that might see improvement of life 
conditions (RPS), new and exciting experiences (ROS), and/or increases in income 
(RPS). Risk aversion is the modal tendency in the population but some types of people 
are emboldened to suppress the bias toward heavily weighing losses for the particular 
reasons presented here. 
A notable finding (or lack thereof) is that Blacks and Latinos are no different from 
Whites in risk propensities. The models account for mitigating factors like age, gender, 
education, and ideology, which are influential toward risk and where non-Whites and 
Whites differ, but no risk differences are uncovered. This finding is expected because 
there is no theoretical basis to believe that minority groups are wired differently than 
Whites in how they value losses and gains. Instead, I hypothesize that minority 
interactions with life situations like resources or social status shape risk differently than 
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from Whites. Columns labeled “Model 2” in Table 4 include models indicating whether 
the effects of the correlates of risk attitudes differ statistically by race and ethnicity. The 
effect of income on the ROS for Latinos differs from income’s effect on the ROS among 
Whites. In fact, income has no effect on the ROS for Whites; its positive effect in Model 
1 was driven solely by Latino respondents. The Latino-White difference in ROS attitudes 
is the only non-White/White difference in effects observed by those models. So my 
hypothesis of difference between Whites and non-Whites is supported only for the ROS, 
Latinos, and the factor of income. 
 
Graph 4: Risk Orientation Scale and Income Estimates for Whites, Latinos 
Graph 4 presents marginal predictions illustrating the effect of income on the 
ROS for Whites and Latinos to demonstrate differences in effects. Ranging from low to 
high income, the slope of the effect of income for Whites is flat and, as presented in the 
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models, not statistically significant. On the other hand, Latinos with low income report 
being less risk accepting than do Latinos with high income. The implication of this 
finding is that low resource acquisition for Latinos predisposes them to highly value the 
losses of what little they possess, and thus low income Latinos tend to act in a way that 
avoids risk. Latinos with higher income are able to withstand uncertainty associated with 
potential loss in favor of potential new gains. In this sense, the rich are able to get richer 
because they pursue dramatic gains while those of low means remain guarded, favoring 
small but certain gains. Comparisons with Whites shows that Latinos are not dissimilar 
when they possess moderate income. Initial disadvantages in risk attitudes that see 
Latinos being more risk averse than Whites at low income levels are balanced by higher 
than average risk acceptance at high income. And so, income raises the tide of risk, lifting 
the boat for Latinos as they rise to the White average for risk acceptance. 
Personality Predictors of Risk Attitudes 
Measures of risk attitudes are also associated with personality traits that shape 
subjective values of losses and gains (Kam 2012). Forms of personality are certainly at 
play when one becomes willing to challenge tendencies toward risk aversion that became 
wired into humans from behavioral evolution. Tameness or excessive caution, for 
example, could yield disproportionate risk aversion. We do not currently know whether 
the disparate treatment of minorities in American society has come to shape similar 
personality-based tendencies to selectively form risk attitudes. Testing for group-based 
differences where traits are involved walks a fine line between concluding that 
accumulated experiences culminate in personalities (nurture) vs. the problematic 
argument that non-White personality has evolved over long periods of time differently 
than that of Whites (nature). Because personality traits are remarkably stable (Rantanan 
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et al. 2007; Cobb-Clark and Schurer 2011), some have concluded that they are partially 
passed down from parents, and it has also been established that twins separated at birth 
exhibit close similarities when compared as adults (Jang et al. 1996). But personality 
traits are also shaped by environmental influences that can for some reason (e.g. trauma) 
encourage personality predispositions among people and are linked to risk attitudes 
(Hopwood et al. 2012; Mishra and Lalumière 2011). Whether non-Whites rely on those 
traits differently from Whites to form risk attitudes could expand on the forms of 
personality that set minorities apart from the majority. 
Personality traits are measured with ten item instruments that make up five scales 
composing the Big 5 core dispositional traits. Traits include the following: (1) 
extraversion, defined as an energetic approach to social and material conditions, 
including sociability and assertiveness in various environments; (2) agreeableness, 
characterized as having a communal orientation with people displaying tendencies like 
trust and modesty; (3) conscientiousness, capturing impulse control enabling people to 
focus energy toward particular goals, delaying gratification, following norms and rules, 
and planning for tasks; (4) emotional stability, defined as opposite to feelings of anxiety, 
nervousness, and sadness geared toward an even-mindedness; and (5) openness, which 
describes being open to new experiences as opposed to being closed minded and it brings 
about breadth and scope of perspectives that contributes to a complex mode of living 
(Gerber et al. 2011; John and Srivasta 1999). The stability of these traits contrasts with 
the fluidity of risk attitudes, which according to framing experiments, may be 
manipulated by alternative framings or life-conditions, so personality traits serve as 
reference points defining values of losses and gains. 
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Table 5: Demographic and Personality Predictors of Risk Attitudes, Linear Regression 
Estimates 
 Risk Propensity Scale Risk Orientation Scale Risk Tolerance Scale 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Black -.06 (.11) -.30 (.91) -.00 (.06) .14 (.51) .25 (.20) .93 (1.73) 
Latino .03 (.12) .29 (.88) .01 (.08) -.55 (.61) .11 (.19) .25 (1.38) 
Other -.07 (.14) .44 (1.43) .03 (.10) .39 (.50) .41 (.27) -1.63 (2.64) 
Age -.06** (.02) -.06** (.02) -.08*** (.01) -.08*** (.01) -.10* (.04) -.09* (.04) 
Income .01 (.02) .01 (.02) .03* (.01) .03* (.01) -.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) 
Education .05+ (.03) .05+ (.02) -.00 (.02) -.00 (.02) .08 (.05) .09+ (.05) 
Female -.30*** (.05) -.30*** (.05) -.14*** (.03) -.14*** (.03) -.30** (.10) -.29** (.10) 
Foreign Born -.25* (.11) -.24* (.11) -.07 (.09) -.07 (.09) .05 (.21) .03 (.21) 
Party ID .01 (.03) .01 (.03) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) -.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) 
Ideology -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.03+ (.02) -.03* (.01) .06 (.05) .06 (.05) 
Extraversion .07* (.02) .04 (.03) .04* (.02) .04* (.01) .01 (.04) .02 (.05) 
Black # Extraversion   .19* (.08)   .05 (.05)   -.13 (.17) 
Latino # Extraversion   .08 (.11)   -.02 (.07)   -.06 (.21) 
Other # Extraversion   -.03 (.10)   .03 (.06)   .02 (.25) 
Agreeableness -.09** (.03) -.08* (.04) -.06** (.02) -.06** (.02) -.04 (.06) -.04 (.05) 
Black # Agreeableness   .02 (.09)   .04 (.06)   -.00 (.24) 
Latino # Agreeableness   -.11 (.15)   .00 (.08)   -.02 (.24) 
Other # Agreeableness   .02 (.17)   -.06 (.09)   .11 (.26) 
Conscientiousness -.16*** (.03) -.15*** (.03) -.02 (.02) -.03 (.02) -.07 (.06) -.08 (.07) 
Black # Conscientiousness   -.04 (.12)   .00 (.07)   .12 (.22) 
Latino # Conscientiousness   -.11 (.14)   .08 (.08)   -.11 (.17) 
Other # Conscientiousness   -.07 (.12)   -.03 (.09)   .22 (.41) 
Emotional Stability .05+ (.03) .04 (.03) .02 (.02) .03* (.01) -.02 (.06) -.02 (.05) 
Black # Emotional Stability   -.00 (.12)   -.06 (.06)   -.10 (.20) 
Latino # Emotional Stability   .13 (.11)   -.02 (.08)   .19 (.23) 
Other # Emotional Stability   -.01 (.12)   -.07 (.09)   -.10 (.24) 
Openness .08* (.03) .09** (.03) .17*** (.02) .17*** (.02) .16* (.06) .17* (.06) 
Black # Openness   -.08 (.10)   -.05 (.06)   -.06 (.22) 
Latino # Openness   -.02 (.14)   .06 (.06)   -.04 (.21) 
Other # Openness   -.01 (.13)   .05 (.09)   .11 (.20) 
Constant 4.18*** (.35) 4.14*** (.37) 2.84*** (.20) 2.84*** (.23) 2.74*** (.54) 2.70*** (.56) 
F-Statistic 9.53*** 4.59*** 19.00*** 9.43*** 3.25*** 1.57* 
Observations 2491 2491 2266 2266 2491 2491 
Linear regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study. Weighted analysis of multiply 
imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variables are scales of risk attitudes measures presented above. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001 
Table 5 contains a modeling scheme similar to Table 4 except measures of the Big 
5 personality traits are the focus. It includes the demographic predictors in the previous 
models to capture the effects of traits in isolation. Several findings emerge that are 
consistent with the literature: openness to new experiences is positively and significantly 
associated with higher than average risk acceptance for the RPS, ROS, and RTS. The 
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personality disposition seems to enable respondents to suppress concerns about potential 
losses that would otherwise yield risk aversion. The implication is that those that are 
closed off to new experiences remained unlikely to be open to possibilities of risks and 
opted to remain risk averse.  
The remainder of the significant effects are localized with RPS and ROS. The 
RTS, the measure of risk associated with the domain of personal finances, mainly relied 
on open personality for respondents to risk personal income. Extraversion and emotional 
stability were associated with risk acceptance for the RPS and ROS. These personality 
traits show that being outgoing as well being measured or judicious in decision making 
are requisites for venturing from the mode of risk aversion. Conscientiousness is 
negatively correlated with the RPS only, indicating that impulse control is a matter of risk 
averse respondents, whereas desiring instant gratification leads to risk acceptance. 
Altogether it appears that risk acceptance is common to expansive personalities, 
especially as it pertains to risk in non-financial domains because the value of gains is 
greater than the average subjective value of potential losses. 
The “Model 2” columns in Table 5 contain tests for whether the effectiveness of 
personality traits as reference points differs for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. The only 
statistically significant difference to emerge is extraversion among Blacks, for whom the 
positive effect on RPS outsizes Whites. Specifically, Graph 5 demonstrates that the slope 
of the effect of extraversion on RPS is positive but steeper than it is for Whites. This 
means not only that extravert Blacks are more risk accepting than risk averse Blacks, but 
also that extravert Blacks are more risk accepting than extravert Whites. 
As with Latinos and income, this finding is important because evidence of risk 
differences between Blacks and Whites is missing overall but apparent under specific 
conditions. Here, extraversion and its association with risk can be thought of as people 
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seizing opportunities. Limited avenues for advancement encountered by Blacks could 
have socialized the group into refraining from risk related opportunities that could lead to 
better living conditions, explaining why low extraversion and risk aversion come hand-
in-hand. And yet, on the other side of the RPS spectrum, socializing experiences seemed 
to have also encouraged extravert Blacks to be more risk accepting than White peers, 
encouraging the pursuit of better living conditions. 
 
 
Graph 5: Risk Propensity Scale and Extraversion Estimates for Whites, Blacks 
Political Predictors of Risk Attitudes 
A third set of tests evaluates whether political measures are relevant to risk 
attitudes and if differences in effects between minorities and the majority emerge. The 
measures are evaluations of external and internal political efficacy. External efficacy is 
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the perception of the responsiveness of external political bodies, specifically whether 
people believe they have a say in politics and that elected officials care about them. I rely 
on disaggregated measures of external efficacy: “Political Response” measures beliefs 
that government officials care about “people like me”; “Political Influence” measures 
beliefs that “people like me can affect what government does”; and “Political Trust” 
gauges perceived frequency that “the federal government does what more Americans 
want.” Internal political efficacy is an additional concept having to do with levels of 
interest in politics and one’s confidence with abilities to grasp the complexities of 
politics. “Political Interest” weighs how interested someone is in politics and “Political 
Cognition” measures perceptions about whether politics and government seem 
complicated or easy. Both external and internal forms of efficacy can be thought of as 
antecedents to consistent formation of political attitudes and involvement or voting. 
I tested the effectiveness of political predictors toward explaining risk because 
political ideology emerged as a statistically significant reference points here and in the 
literature. With liberal respondents reporting risk acceptance and conservatives opting for 
risk aversion, views about politics and political institutions may also be related to risk if 
people intend to pursue them for changes to life conditions. The results presented in 
Table 6 show that political measures exert a good deal of influence on risk attitudes. 
Those that reported that politics were easy to follow also reported being less risk 
accepting and more risk averse than average on the RPS and RTS. Similar negative 
effects emerge with the belief that people like me can affect what government does 
(“Political Influence”) on the ROS. These results indicate that people that are confident 
about politics are risk averse. Risk accepting individuals are less confident as it seems 
that valuing gains more than losses might take people away from political thoughtfulness, 
which demand patience and much delayed gratification. Being interested in politics, on 
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the other hand, is associated with risk acceptance on the ROS as novelty seekers might be 
drawn to political events. 
Table 6: Demographic and Political Predictors of Risk Attitudes, Linear Regression 
Estimates 
 Risk Propensity Scale Risk Orientation Scale Risk Tolerance Scale 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Black -.09 (.11) .54 (.78) -.02 (.06) .02 (.45) .24 (.20) 1.91 (1.52) 
Latino .04 (.13) .19 (1.20) -.04 (.09) -.94 (.80) .07 (.19) -.14 (1.25) 
Other -.04 (.14) -.26 (1.16) .01 (.10) .06 (.56) .37 (.26) -.56 (1.50) 
Age -.09*** (.02) -.09*** (.02) -.12*** (.01) -.12*** (.01) -.14*** (.04) -.13*** (.04) 
Income -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) .02+ (.01) .02+ (.01) -.04 (.04) -.04 (.04) 
Education .06* (.03) .05+ (.03) .01 (.02) .01 (.02) .08 (.05) .09+ (.05) 
Female -.34*** (.05) -.33*** (.05) -.18*** (.03) -.17*** (.03) -.33*** (.09) -.30*** (.09) 
Foreign Born -.22* (.10) -.15 (.09) -.04 (.10) -.05 (.10) .09 (.20) .08 (.20) 
Party ID .01 (.02) .01 (.02) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.04) -.01 (.04) 
Ideology -.02 (.03) -.02 (.02) -.05*** (.01) -.05*** (.01) .04 (.05) .05 (.05) 
Political Response -.01 (.03) -.03 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.03 (.03) -.15* (.06) -.17* (.07) 
Black # Political Response   -.09 (.14)   .01 (.06)   .05 (.25) 
Latino # Political Response   .29* (.12)   .05 (.12)   .12 (.22) 
Other # Political Response   .04 (.12)   .24* (.11)   .19 (.25) 
Political Influence -.00 (.03) .04 (.03) -.03+ (.02) -.03 (.02) .07 (.06) .11+ (.06) 
Black # Political Influence   -.16 (.10)   -.01 (.05)   -.05 (.19) 
Latino # Political Influence   -.28* (.13)   .04 (.08)   -.51* (.21) 
Other # Political Influence   -.03 (.13)   .01 (.08)   .21 (.19) 
Political Trust .04 (.05) .02 (.05) .01 (.03) .02 (.03) .05 (.08) .04 (.09) 
Black # Political Trust   .22 (.16)   -.01 (.09)   -.12 (.31) 
Latino # Political Trust   -.16 (.20)   .01 (.12)   .17 (.26) 
Other # Political Trust   .10 (.17)   -.39** (.13)   -.29 (.25) 
Political Interest -.05 (.03) -.03 (.03) .06** (.02) .05* (.02) .03 (.05) .03 (.05) 
Black # Political Interest   -.08 (.11)   .00 (.06)   -.33 (.22) 
Latino # Political Interest   -.07 (.15)   .11 (.09)   .11 (.17) 
Other # Political Interest   .05 (.17)   .12* (.06)   .40* (.20) 
Political Cognition -.08*** (.02) -.08*** (.02) -.00 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.10* (.04) -.08+ (.04) 
Black # Political Cognition   -.10 (.09)   .00 (.05)   -.03 (.16) 
Latino # Political Cognition   .18 (.12)   .06 (.08)   .12 (.16) 
Other # Political Cognition   -.14 (.12)   -.00 (.07)   -.29 (.19) 
Constant 4.18*** (.28) 4.01*** (.25) 3.69*** (.19) 3.76*** (.20) 3.53*** (.47) 3.38*** (.47) 
F-Statistic 5.90*** 4.15*** 8.70*** 5.07*** 3.47*** 3.29*** 
Observations 2491 2491 2266 2266 2491 2491 
Linear regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study. Weighted analysis of multiply 
imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variables are scales of risk attitudes measures presented above. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001 
Tests for racial and ethnic differences of the politics underpinning risk reveal 
disproportionate reliance on some aspects by Latinos. Latinos believing that people like 
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them can affect what government does (“Political Influence”) emerge as being much 
more risk averse than White peers both on the RPS and RTS. Conversely, it is also the 
case that those believing they have little effect on government are much more risk 
accepting than similarly situated Whites. Differences for Latinos and Whites based on the 
Political Influence measure are presented in Graph 6 that shows stark differences in slope 
of effects. Specifically, though Political Influence runs in a positive direction that is not 
significant for Whites, Latinos demonstrate the opposite effect -- risk declines with 
increased confidence about affecting government. Risk-averse Latinos feel confident 
about their influence on government whereas risk accepting Latinos do not. That deficit is 
much larger than it is for White respondents. 
 Latino and White differences on the effect of Political Influence for risk attitudes 
is important because it is the case for the RPS and RTS. This consistency could mean that 
the connection between Latino risk attitudes and a sense of effecting politics are 
interwoven and applicable in a variety of situations. If, for example, risk attitudes 
measured by the RPS or the RTS are found to have negative effects on political 
participation, it might be concluded that risk takers did not participate because they also 
held low levels of external political efficacy. If, for example, the RPS and RTS have a 
positive effect on participation, it might be concluded that non-participants were risk 
averse but also maintained high senses of perceived external political efficacy. 
Subsequent chapters will demonstrate that the effect of risk among Latinos on political 
participation oscillates based on the political activity. I observe later that risk-averse 
Latinos are less involved in non-electoral activities but vote more often than do risk-
accepting Latinos. The finding here provides the context that risk averse Latinos, 
perceiving high degrees of influence on government, judiciously spent their energy on 
voting, where their voice is arguably more influential. Risk accepting Latinos, who have 
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weaker perceptions of effectiveness, were more involved in non-electoral protest activity 
(providing instant gratification) but failed to follow up and go vote. 
 
Graph 6: Risk Propensity & Risk Tolerance Scales and “Effect What Government Does” 
for Whites, Latinos 
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Graph 7: Risk Propensity Scale and “Officials Care About People Like Me” for Whites, 
Latinos 
An exception to the confidence of risk-averse Latinos about their effect on politics 
is the belief that elected officials care about “people like me.” Compared to Whites, risk-
averse Latinos were more likely to say officials cared about them not at all or very little. 
The belief abated with increased risk: those saying that officials cared were more risk 
accepting than those that did not. In addition, as with the previous findings, differences 
between risk-averse and risk-accepting Latinos were significantly different from risk-
averse and risk-accepting Whites. This finding raises the curious proposition that 
although risk-averse Latinos believe in their effectiveness toward the political system, 
they also believe that individual officials do not care about them very much. The 
proposition is fascinating because it communicates belief or confidence about changing 
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the workings of government but not about the people that run it. Risk-accepting Latinos 
might not believe in or feel confident about affecting institutions but find officials more 
trustworthy as a potential points of influence. And these tendencies are unique to Latinos 
given the significance of interactions that compare them to Whites. 
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Chapter 3: Non-Electoral Participation: The Effect of Risk Attitudes on 
Latino Political Action 
Minority political involvement was bolstered by the immigrant rights marches of 
2006 and Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential election. Using the 2008 ANES, I observe 
that Blacks and Latinos reported being or desiring to be as involved as Whites (in some 
cases more involved) in non-electoral activities like protests and meeting attendance. And 
yet, given the gaps in the relatively low-cost activity of voting, we might expect that 
costlier non-electoral involvement should be even less likely for Blacks and Latinos than 
for Whites. This chapter builds on evidence that risk attitudes -- a spectrum between risk 
aversion and risk acceptance -- is positively associated with non-electoral involvement 
(Kam 2012). It investigates whether risk attitudes positively predict Black and Latino 
non-electoral participation, whether the effect is significantly different from that of 
Whites, and whether prior participation is a requirement for the association between risk 
and minority involvement. I rely on two measures of risk attitudes and find that risk 
accepting Latinos (and Blacks in fewer cases) were more willing than Whites to turn to 
non-electoral politics despite having little experience. Risk attitudes were effective at 
increasing the likelihood of future participation by Latinos with no prior experience, 
while only predictive among previously involved Whites and Blacks. These findings 
imply that a regard for new conditions captured by high risk attitudes (risk acceptance) 
not only enables non-whites to suppress high costs of participation to match Whites, but 
also that it is a process incorporating newcomer Latinos to politics. 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the conditions under which Blacks and Latinos report 
rates of political participation equal to or greater than that of Whites. In such activities, 
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Kam (2012) determined that involvement is common among risk takers who pursue 
novelty or excitement versus risk avoiders who prefer certainty. Does risk acceptance 
help to explain Black and Latino participation in non-electoral activities? Does risk 
acceptance have a greater mobilizing effect for Blacks and Latinos than among Whites? I 
argue that risk taking causes Blacks and Latinos to selectively respond to possible gains 
and losses associated with political participation and that this conditional response helps 
to explain racial-ethnic participatory differences. The dependent variables include interest 
in future participation and reported involvement in past activities. 
One example of non-electoral involvement was participation by millions in the 
2006 immigration marches across the country. The mass movement sought to apply 
pressure on lawmakers considering immigration reform. Latino participation in particular 
involved a degree of risk -- adults missed work, adolescents walked out of school, and 
undocumented immigrants potentially exposed their unlawful status. This political 
activity was high-cost but the stakes were high for groups like Latinos with mixed-status 
families or co-ethnicity with immigrant populations. This chapter considers willingness 
to act in similar non-electoral politics drawing in individuals of many walks of life. 
Compared to Whites, risk emerges as a disposition enabling Black and Latino 
participation that increases their representation in the ranks of those present in non-
electoral activities. 
The measures of risk that I employ range from low values signifying risk aversion 
to high values indicating risk acceptance. The measures are continuous scales that are 
indices of items tapping affective responses to uncertainty in particular ways (“Risk 
Propensity”) and positioning with relation to uncertainty due to specific circumstances 
(“Risk Orientation”) (Meertens and Lion 2008; Maestas and Pollock 2013). I rely on both 
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prongs, one general and one specific, to evaluate how tackling life’s uncertainties may be 
associated with participatory actions. 
These two conceptualizations offer survey measures of the logic of prospect 
theory; that the public is predominantly risk averse to protect existing gains, that potential 
losses are valued greater than potential gains, and that individuals accept risk or 
uncertainty to recover or avert losses (Kahneman 2013). Their benefit is saving space in 
surveys, providing generalizability outside of financial contexts, and shifting from 
behavioral scenarios that are context specific to more general responses to risk that are 
remarkably stable (Maestas et. al 2013). Ultimately, the measures are not political in 
nature so their association to political participation is evidence that comfort with 
uncertainty, all things considered, is an aspect of mobilization. 
An association between risk and non-electoral involvement is found in the 
behavior literature (Kam), but we do not know whether that relationship applies to racial 
and ethnic minorities. I observe that in the 2008-09 American National Elections Study 
Panel, Blacks and Latinos for the most part report being as involved as Whites on such 
activities. This observation is peculiar because involvement in less conventional 
activities, like petitioning, demonstrating, protesting, or attending rallies, is costly but 
should be less likely than the lowest-cost activity of voting (Dalton 2002; Dalton and van 
Sickle 2008; Bowler and Segura 2012). As minority groups are already disadvantaged 
relative to Whites in terms of the elements essential to voting -- fewer resources, less 
interest, and less mobilization (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010) -- participation in higher 
order, higher cost activities ought to be diminished as well. 
 An alternative theory is that non-electoral involvement might yield more 
immediate results for minority communities or serve as an introduction to those 
previously disconnected from politics. Does risk acceptance explain Black and Latino 
 46 
non-electoral participation? If so, does it explain how minority groups achieve parity 
despite the well-known differences in voting levels. Specifically, do effects of risk for 
Blacks and Latinos significantly differ from the concept’s influence on participation for 
Whites? This inquiry raises the possibility that although risk averse Blacks and Latinos 
could perceive possible losses from participation (such as time) and therefore participate 
less than Whites, risk-accepting Blacks and Latinos could be disproportionately more 
drawn toward participation than are Whites. 
I test these questions using self-reported measures of likely and prior involvement 
in participatory activities found in the 2008-09ANES Panel, which contains measures of 
Risk Propensity Scale (RPS) and Risk Orientation Scale (ROS). I find support for the 
above hypotheses and conclude that minority groups are represented higher than average 
among risk accepting participants. 
LITERATURE AND EXPECTATIONS 
Prospect theory informs the conceptualization of risk attitudes by findings that 
framing influences decision-making in risk-related scenarios. Tversky and Kahneman's 
(1979; 1981) framing experiments showed that the situations people find themselves in 
matter; when facing scenarios with uncertain outcomes, positive outcomes with certainty 
are preferred to probabilistic choices when facing gains, so risk aversion is the dominant 
strategy among the public. But probabilistic choices are more popular than certain yet 
negative outcomes when people face losses. So individuals that find situations untenable 
might be emboldened to accept risk in pursuit of new conditions. This chapter explores 
the link between risk attitudes and participation in non-electoral political activities 
through the lens of race and ethnicity, determining whether (when?) minorities might be 
emboldened to participate in costly activities with uncertainty of success. 
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Risk and politics are certainly connected. One study of market reforms in fragile 
democracies finds that risk attitudes explain mass and elite decision-making (Weyland 
2002). It shows that the human tendency toward risk aversion in times of prosperity (or 
domain of gains) was at work when Latin American countries decided whether to adopt 
policies that liberalized economies. Citizens and elites considering market reforms were 
cautious, sometimes rejecting policies that offered positive but uncertain changes. This 
application indicates that prospect theory contextualizes behavior that outside political 
observers pegged as non-rational at the time. Applications of prospect theory have also 
explained political behavior in American politics with social survey data. Kam (2012) 
showed that high-cost activities that provided novelty despite uncertain outcomes were 
more compatible with risk accepting respondents versus the risk averse. With voting 
behavior, however, risk avoiders tend to support congressional incumbents that are 
known quantities and thereby offer certainty in representation. Risk aversion was more 
common among supporters of challengers, as campaigns provided promises of new, 
future experiences (Eckles et al. 2014).  
Risk attitudes may also serve as a lens that filters external cues. One test advanced 
frameworks that shifted how public policies were presented, emphasizing potential losses 
or gains that they posed. When the frameworks were mixed together, Kam and Simas 
(2010) found that respondent sorted themselves -- the risk accepting chose probabilistic 
outcomes that focused on preventing loss and the risk averse gravitated to certain 
outcomes posing secured gains. The implication is that policy framing will find receptive 
audiences based on levels of risk in the public. For example, a politician’s position on a 
policy will yield different levels of support along the risk attitudes spectrum. Still another 
example demonstrates that risk mitigates positions on issues like free trade and 
immigration depending a respondent’s low or high skill level of employment. 
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Specifically, opposition to the policies was higher if respondents were risk averse and 
were also low skilled employees, indicating their exposure to negative effects of 
globalization. Supporter of the policies were insulated by being high skilled workers and 
also risk accepting, indicating openness to new experiences (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010). 
Lastly, when respondents that were primed about the uncertain nature of government 
policies, military intervention in Darfur saw less support from the risk averse, more 
support from the risk accepting, and fewer Don’t Know responses (Eckles and Schaffner 
2011). Altogether, approaches to risk provide a basis for interpretations that were 
formative to political positions and participatory behavior. 
The relationship between risk and politics may be different among non-white 
minority groups because their approaches toward risk may be different from Whites. 
During the recent economic downturn, worries about economic security were widespread 
and no group in American society was insulated from instability (Hacker et al. 2010a). 
Some had it worse than others, however, and Blacks and Latinos reported more unmet 
needs and higher vulnerability to economic shocks than did Whites (Hacker et al. 2010b). 
Risk attitudes were also found to have been associated with economic worries, 
experiences with economic shocks, and support for risk buffering government policies 
(Hacker et al. 2013). Specifically, risk averse respondents to surveys were found to have 
exhibited high worries, reported negative experiences, and desired aid that would reduce 
financial uncertainty.  
Minority experiences during the economic downturn were worse than they were 
for Whites but it is not clear whether the conditions resulted in more risk aversion or 
whether any sort of risk attitudes insulated them from the tumultuous economic climate. 
An initial assessment of risk tolerance found that Black, Native American, Latino, and 
Asian respondents were more willing than Whites to undertake financial risk (Barsky et 
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al. 1997). In experimental settings, Latino identity was linked to disproportionately high 
risk taking independent of other factors (Cox and Harrison 2008). When parity in 
exposure to information about financial markets is reached, Blacks and Latinos engaged 
in more “substantial financial risk” than Whites. A strong desire to catch up in terms of 
standard of living and social status are motivating factors, Yao et al. (2005) argue, in that 
taking risks makes sense to “one who realistically has little at stake” (p. 58). 
Motivations for political participation are also dissimilar as minorities are 
disadvantaged compared to Whites. Although grievances against minority status are 
commonplace, turning to politics is less common for Blacks and Latinos compared to 
Whites. Doing so is pressing because policy positions of groups like Latinos are distinct 
from the majority and other minority groups (Leal 2007). In voter turnout, while Blacks 
made up a greater share of the electorate than Latinos, their collective share remained 
unchanged in Presidential elections between 1972 and 2004. In 1972, both groups 
comprised 10 percent of the overall electorate with a notable uptick in 2004 to 17 percent 
(Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Blacks and Latinos are similarly disadvantaged to Whites 
that are native-born, older, wealthier, and more educated and display high levels of civic 
engagement (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare 2004).  
In cognitive engagement, Blacks and Latinos are “more alike than different” since 
they know much less about politics than Whites (Pantoja 2005). Doubt is cast on their 
ability to “effectively pursue political interests, make informed political choices, and 
create a government more responsive to their needs” (ibid p.34). The source, it would 
seem, are disadvantages like underfunded schools reinforcing low educational attainment, 
low-wage occupations that do not promote attention to politics, and language barriers 
affecting motivation to seek out information, its availability, and ability to process it 
(ibid; Abrajano and Alvarez, Luskin 1990). Although access to educational opportunities 
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has improved during the last fifty years, for example, basic knowledge that aids 
participation is lacking for minority groups (Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996). Such 
disparities -- having a smaller slew of facts, experiences, and firm positions to draw from 
– suggest an additional dynamic.  Participation among Blacks and Latinos may be less 
driven by cost-benefit calculations (because they know less about costs and benefits) and 
more so by factors such as calling to mind comfort with uncertainty, and this chapter will 
investigate such factors. 
The literature maintains that the conditions for risk acceptance are the same as 
those responsible for lower levels of political participation by racial and ethnic 
minorities. And yet other work explains that high risk is associated with increased 
participation (Kam). In that regard, it is unrealistic to expect that minorities exhibit the 
opposite: high risk but low participation. Instead, we might see that a “having nothing to 
lose” mentality undergirding risk insulates them from disadvantages in the costs 
associated with participation. Accounting for mitigating circumstances like age, 
education, income, gender, partisanship, and ideology, which distinguish minority groups 
from the majority and from each other, could reveal that minority identity indeed reacts 
with risk to boost engagement. Whether rates of participation by Blacks and Latinos 
achieve parity or surpass those of Whites, after taking account of risk, remains to be seen. 
Does risk acceptance explain non-electoral political involvement in general and increased 
minority likelihoods specifically? The following hypotheses evaluate the research 
question. 
 
Risk Acceptance Hypothesis: Respondents with high levels of risk acceptance are more 
likely to participate in non-electoral activities than those with low levels of risk 
acceptance (risk averse). 
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Minority Risk Acceptance Hypothesis: Among those with high values of risk acceptance, 
Blacks and Latinos will surpass Whites in rates of non-electoral participation. 
 
How do disadvantaged groups overcome hurdles to involvement and manage to 
be as involved as the majority in activities are that costlier? One answer is motivation: 
opportunities for participation in non-electoral activities can be more frequent than voting 
and their benefits more immediate. Participation in city politics, for example, can provide 
fast results with direct bearings on day-to-day life versus voting for statewide and federal 
offices. Another answer may be trust: issues with partisan gerrymandering, voter 
identification laws, or generalized distrust in the political system may inhibit voting while 
promoting activities in less official realms. Blacks or Latinos may be more motivated 
about and trusting toward non-electoral politics than are Whites, and therefore participate 
at roughly similar rates. 
MEASUREMENTS 
I test the hypotheses advanced in the section above a data source that contains 
measures of risk attitudes and non-electoral participation. The 2008-09 ANES Panel 
Study maintained a pool of respondents from prior to and after the 2008 presidential 
election cycle. I analyze various waves of the dataset because no single wave contained 
all demographic, political, participatory, and risk attitude measures necessary for 
multivariate regression analysis. Wave 1 (January 2008) provides demographic 
information, and the dependent variables for political participation are from Wave 17 
(May 2009). Items measuring risk attitudes come from Wave 15 (March 2009) which 
included items for the RTS and RPS, and Wave 22 (October 2009), which contained 
items for the ROS. I compiled and analyzed these data with cross sectional sampling 
weights for the wave of dependent variables. 
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The dependent variables are measures of non-electoral political participation, both 
past and future. Questions about previous participation ask whether the respondent has 
engaged in a range of specific activities. Questions about participation in the future 
inquire about the same activities with the prompt, “In the future, how likely are you to…” 
The survey first asks respondents about likely participation in the future and follows up 
with inquiries about previous experience. 
The following shows non-electoral activity means for White, Black, and Latino 
respondents as well as difference of means separately comparing Blacks and Latinos to 
Whites. My approach provides a snapshot for whether evidence of significant differences 
in participatory behavior is apparent. Given the high costs of non-voting participatory 
activities, participation should be uncommon (Dalton; Dalton and van Sickle), 
particularly for disadvantaged groups compared to Whites (Bowler and Segura), but that 
is not the case. With White respondents as a base for comparisons, I am able to determine 
whether non-white participation by Blacks and Latinos lags behind, is at parity, or 
exceeds participation by the majority population. The ANES variables range in their 
costliness from (a) relatively low-cost like signing petitions (b) mid-tier activities like 
attending group or local government meetings, distributing information and recruiting 
others, and (3) high-cost actions like joining a protest and making monetary donations 
(Dalton 2002; Dalton and van Sickle 2008; Bowler and Segura 2012). I then test whether, 
to what degree, and in what direction such participation is shaped by risk attitudes, and 
how risk attitudes might help shape differences between white and non-white 
participation. 
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Future Political Participation 
The ANES first asked respondents how likely they were to engage in specific 
actions in the future. The question reads: “In the future, how likely are you to…” and 
respondents were sequentially asked about (a) joining a protest, march, rally, or 
demonstration; (b) attending a meeting of a city government or school board; (c) signing 
a petition on the internet about a political or social issue; (d) signing a petition in person; 
(e) donating money to non-religious organizations concerned with political or social 
issues; (f) attending meetings to discuss concerns; (g) inviting others to attend a similar 
meeting; (h) distributing information supporting political concerns; and (i) donating 
money to a religious organization. The response options were: Not at all likely, A little 
likely, Moderately likely, Very likely, and Extremely likely. I recoded the 5-point scale to 
range between 0 and 1 instead of the original 1 to 5 to ease interpretation. Specifically, 
values to the response options became: 0, Not at all likely; .25, A little likely; .50, 
Moderately likely; .75, Very likely; and 1, Extremely likely.  Observations above a 
midpoint of .5 indicate a higher willingness while those below .5 a lower willingness. 
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Table 7: Future Political Participation: Wave 17, 2008-08 ANES 
In the future, how likely are you to…? Coded: 0 (not at all), 











Protest, Rally:  
Join in a protest, march, rally, or demonstration? 
.18 .16 .21 .29 .05 .12* 
Gov. Meeting: Attend a meeting of a town or city government or 
school board? 
.34 .33 .42 .33 .09** .00 
E-Petition: Sign a petition on the Internet about a political or 
social issue? 
.34 .33 .35 .42 .01 .09* 
Petition:  
Sign a petition on paper about a political or social issue? 
.41 .41 .42 .47 .01 .06 
Pol. Donation: Give money to any other organization concerned 
with a political or social issue, not counting a religious organization? 
.29 .29 .30 .31 .01 .02 
Pol. Meeting: Attend a meeting to talk about political or social 
concerns? 
.27 .26 .35 .27 .09** .01 
Pol. Invite: Invite someone to attend a meeting about political or 
social concerns? 
.20 .18 .31 .21 .14*** .04 
Pol. Handout: Distribute information or advertisements 
supporting a political or social interest group? 
.17 .15 .24 .23 .09** .07* 
Rel. Donation:  
Give money to a religious organization? 
.55 .53 .65 .56 .12** .03 
Observations 2389 1997 187 117   
Weighted Observations 2389 1832 284.6 185.1   
The frequencies presented in Table 7 show that the public did not report a high 
interest in participating in future political activities. The only exception is the willingness 
to make religious donations (.55 mean). While this religious activity is not necessarily 
political, it shows that the public is willing to spend resources but that politics is not the 
priority. The public’s commitment to make similar donations but to social or political 
organizations is much lower, at a rate of .29, or “just a little.” Of the remainder, the most 
popular options were signing petitions online (.34) and in-person (.41) as well as 
attending meetings of a city government or school board (.34). The resource commitment 
of these activities is not major and, yet the public reported being “a little” to 
“moderately” likely to do so. Activities declined in popularity as their cost increased. 
Making political donations and attending social or political concern meetings were less 
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popular, while those surveyed mostly reported “not at all likely” to join a protest, march, 
rally, or demonstration and distribute information supporting a social or political group. 
Here I also affirm that that Black and Latino participation rates do not fall below 
those of White respondents despite changes in popularity of activities due to increased 
costs (Bowler and Segura). Instead, Black and Latino respondents reported being more 
likely to participate than Whites in some activities. Of the least popular, Latinos reported 
being more willing to join a protest, march, rally, or demonstration, Blacks were more 
likely to invite someone to attend a meeting about political or social concerns, and both 
Blacks and Latinos intended to distribute information supporting social and political 
groups more so than Whites. Non-Whites were also more interested than Whites in 
attending meetings about government and social concerns, signing petitions online, and 
giving money to religious organizations. Difference of means indicate that Blacks more 
so than Latinos report more instances of intended participation rates that surpass Whites. 
Table 7 also yields that differences between in intended participation between 
Whites and Blacks and Whites and Latinos are not negative regardless of statistical 
significance. That is Black and Latino mean values are at least equal to or greater than 
mean values for Whites. These activities are costlier than voting, so if Blacks and Latinos 
vote less than Whites, why are they not less willing than Whites to be involved in these 
activities? One answer might be that the non-electoral activities do not require citizenship 
and are frequented by Latino non-citizens for political expression (Leal 2002), have 
become a strategy for citizens alike. Shared community norms have helped communities 
of color become involved in informal politics where voting could have little benefit 
(Anoll 2018). Another might be that the accumulation of voter ineligibility experiences 
due to voter identification laws or felon disenfranchisement disproportionately affecting 
the right to vote of Blacks and Latinos. If the two are explanations for Black and Latino 
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participation, the unique life experiences would be represented by risk attitudes to explain 
the behavior. 
Both Blacks and Latinos must be basing decisions for openness to participation on 
some predisposition that provides an alternative sense of the costs associated with 
participating. That is, some unseen feature of their identity suppresses concerns about 
cost and promotes the benefits of pursuing new and exciting opportunities relating to 
politics. My argument is that risk attitudes, specifically risk acceptance, mobilizes non-
Whites in a manner parallel to that of Whites, but more so. I explore this potential effect 
with models for intended past as well as future involvement. 
Prior Political Participation 
After inquiring about the likelihood of future participation, the ANES asked 
respondents, “Have you done this, or have you never done it?” Possible responses were 
(0) “never done this” or (1) “have done it.” A mean value of .25 indicates that 25 percent 
of those surveyed engaged in an activity. The frequencies are weighted using ANES-
provided cross-sectional sampling weights, probability sampling units, and stratification 
clusters to generate a sample that is representative of the US public. 
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Table 8: Past Political Participation: Wave 17, 2008-08 ANES 
Have you done this, or have you never done it?  











Protest, Rally:  
Joined a protest, march, rally, or demonstration. 
.25 .22 .27 .39 .05 .17** 
Gov. Meeting: Attended a meeting of a town or city government 
or school board. 
.62 .64 .58 .51 -.06 -.12+ 
E-Petition: Signed a petition on the Internet about a political or 
social issue. 
.41 .42 .38 .29 -.04 -.13* 
Petition: Signed a petition on paper about a political or social 
issue. 
.72 .74 .67 .70 -.07 -.04 
Pol. Donation: Not counting a religious organization, gave money 
to any other organization concerned with a political or social issue. 
.51 .54 .42 .43 -.12* -.10 
Pol. Meeting: Attended a meeting to talk about political or social 
concerns. 
.46 .47 .47 .43 .01 -.04 
Pol. Invite: Invited someone to attend a meeting about political or 
social concerns. 
.26 .25 .32 .26 .08+ .01 
Pol. Handout: Distributed information or advertisements 
supporting a political or social interest group. 
.26 .26 .30 .22 .04 -.04 
Rel. Donation:  
Gave money to a religious organization. 
.84 .84 .88 .80 .04 -.04 
Observations 2389 1997 187 117   
Weighted Observations 2389 1832 284.6 185.1   
Table 8 lists rates of past participation. A majority or more of the respondents 
reported having been involved in donating to religious organizations (.84), signing 
petitions (.72), attending government meetings (.62), and making political donations 
(.51). These activities were also among the more popular when it came to reporting 
interest in future participation. The least frequent options were attending protests, 
marches, rallies or demonstrations (.25), distributing information (.26), and inviting 
others to group meetings (.26) with a quarter of respondents reporting involvement. The 
public’s willingness to participate in future activities is therefore tethered to its prior 
experience. 
At the same time, racial and ethnic differences in past participation present a 
different image from intended future participation. Specifically, minority groups were 
less involved and have less experience than Whites in certain modes of participation. 
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Compared to Whites, Blacks reported lower (but not statistically significant) rates of 
attending local government meetings and signing petitions, as well as donating to 
political organizations at a rate of 12% less than Whites (significant at the 95% level). 
Latinos ranked as being less involved than Whites (but not significantly so) in signing 
petitions, donating to political groups, attending political meetings, handing out political 
information, and making religious donations. Latinos were significantly less involved 
than Whites when it came to signing petitions online (95% significance) and attending 
government meetings (90% significance). All told, involvement by Blacks and Latinos is 
in keeping with expectations carried over from voting, that minorities may be less 
involved due to the costs of participation. 
And yet, Black and Latino prior participation surpassed White respondents in 
specific activities. Blacks reported having invited others to attend social and political 
group meetings at a rate of 8 percent more than Whites (90% level). 39 percent of Latinos 
also reported having joined a protest, march, rally or demonstration compared to 22 
percent of Whites, a statistically significant difference of 17 percent. Increased 
participation by the two can be contextualized by the time period of the interviews. 
Barack Obama’s presidential election saw a surge of minority voters, but particularly 
among Black voters that closed the turnout gap with Whites for the first time. Latino 
political involvement was also boosted by the 2006 immigration rights movement with 
wide scale protest activity nationwide. The two examples suggest that minority groups 
underwent unique experiences that helped them bridge the costs of participation. The 
events and opportunities seemed to have been so motivating that White participation was 
outpaced by Blacks and Latinos, but whether these differences exist before or after this 
unique time period are unclear. This suggests the results here might not generalize to 
other times but provide an ideal test for the influence of risk attitudes since involvement 
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is high. Finding one might provide tools for the future mobilization of non-white minority 
groups. 
I hypothesize that enthusiasm over new outcomes conceptualized by respondents 
valuing gains over potential losses (or costs) help explain political participation in 
general. Specifically, I expect that data showing non-whites as having been, or wanting to 
be more involved than Whites are explained by the concept. In the subsequent section, I 
test whether high values in risk acceptance explain Black and Latino participation in 
relation to White peers. An implication of this work is that participation driven by the 
not-entirely-rational processes presented by prospect theory could yield opportunities for 
mobilization that enhance minority participation in electoral and non-electoral politics. 
FINDINGS 
Participation in non-electoral politics can be high in cost and uncertain in result. 
Risk-accepting individuals should be more likely to face and accept this uncertainty than 
are those who are averse to risks. Risk acceptance is specified in the risk attitudes 
measure, which is a spectrum ranging from low values (representing the tendency for risk 
aversion) and high values (indicating risk acceptance). Prospect theory explains that risk 
aversion is predominant due to our minds being wired from biology to favor certainty 
over uncertainty. The psychological effect of risk aversion is that we place more 
emphasis on preventing losses rather than making gains, so we generally avoid choices 
that give the appearance of being costly and uncertain. In practice, risk aversion ought to 
lead to avoidance of non-electoral political activities. Risk acceptance represents the 
emboldening of risk attitudes where instead of losses being worth more than gains, the 
mind is encouraged to place greater emphasis on what might be gained rather than what 
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might be lost. In this sense, non-electoral participation ought to be common among the 
risk accepting. 
This is already established (Kam 2012), and my contribution is the hypothesis that 
the cognitive pattern disproportionately influences minority involvement. I advance this 
possibility because of observations that minorities can be (or desire to be) as involved as 
Whites despite the high cost of non-electoral activities. In some cases, minorities report 
participatory rates that surpass Whites. By contrast, Blacks and Latinos tend to be less 
involved with voting even though it is an easier form of political expression. Voting is 
perhaps least preferred by non-Whites because non-electoral avenues could have a 
greater bearing on local politics and daily life. The enthusiasm accompanying such 
preferences could be embodied by risk attitudes, so its use by Blacks and Latinos 
outpaces that of Whites because its utility is higher. In other words, if risk attitudes are 
positively correlated with non-electoral political participation, it could be the case that 
correlations for Black and Latino participation surpass that of Whites. 
Future Participation 
In this section, I present results from ordered logistic regression models 
explaining reported frequencies of participation in non-electoral activities. The dependent 
variables are ordinal scales with the categories Not at all, A little, Moderately, Very, and 
Extremely Likely coded in that order. Positive coefficients mean more participation and 
negative ones indicate less. The models contain log odds coefficients that are unaltered, 
thus difficult to interpret other than providing indication of estimated effects in negative 
or positive directions. I therefore also provide a table of predicted probabilities indicating 
changes in the likelihood of respondents reporting “Moderately”, “Very,” and 
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“Extremely” likely (versus reporting “Not at all” and “A little”) per unit increase in the 
variables of interest - the RPS and RPS measures of risk attitudes. 
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Black .48* (.20) .60** (.21) .10 (.20) .16 (.22) .28 (.19) .75*** (.21) .91*** (.23) .74*** (.22) .89*** (.21) 
Latino .72* (.28) .19 (.25) .43+ (.23) .63** (.24) .35 (.27) .30 (.27) .36 (.26) .48+ (.27) .53* (.24) 
Other .14 (.33) -.25 (.33) -.05 (.32) -.68* (.34) .09 (.32) .12 (.31) .06 (.30) .15 (.31) -.02 (.28) 
RPS .12+ (.07) .04 (.07) -.01 (.07) -.04 (.07) .13+ (.07) .13+ (.07) .16* (.08) .16* (.08) -.16* (.06) 
ROS .43** (.13) .37** (.12) .34** (.11) .37*** (.11) .23* (.11) .46*** (.12) .52*** (.12) .45*** (.12) -.13 (.12) 
Age -.12* (.05) .08 (.05) -.03 (.04) .22*** (.04) .17*** (.04) .17*** (.05) .06 (.05) .03 (.05) .10* (.04) 
Income -.06 (.05) .09+ (.05) .11* (.05) .06 (.05) .13** (.04) .01 (.05) -.04 (.05) -.02 (.05) .13** (.05) 
Education .25*** (.07) .27*** (.06) .14* (.06) .16** (.06) .42*** (.05) .34*** (.06) .22*** (.06) .11+ (.06) .11+ (.06) 
Female -.10 (.12) .04 (.11) .21* (.11) .16 (.11) .32** (.11) .12 (.11) .11 (.12) .11 (.12) .22* (.11) 
Foreign Born .43 (.27) .31 (.27) .39 (.24) .36+ (.20) .35 (.26) .24 (.28) .24 (.26) .49+ (.25) -.36 (.26) 
Party ID -.00 (.04) -.03 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.02 (.04) -.01 (.04) -.02 (.03) -.04 (.04) -.00 (.04) .09* (.04) 
Ideology .02 (.04) .05 (.04) .01 (.04) .04 (.04) .00 (.05) .02 (.05) .06 (.06) .02 (.06) .08 (.04) 
cut1 2.76*** (.66) 2.03*** (.56) 1.52** (.54) 1.46** (.53) 2.99*** (.57) 3.16*** (.57) 3.44*** (.61) 3.41*** (.65) -.63 (.58) 
cut2 3.62*** (.67) 3.35*** (.57) 2.51*** (.54) 2.81*** (.53) 4.21*** (.58) 4.36*** (.58) 4.56*** (.61) 4.49*** (.66) .00 (.58) 
cut3 4.87*** (.66) 4.38*** (.57) 3.49*** (.54) 3.97*** (.54) 5.43*** (.59) 5.54*** (.59) 5.70*** (.61) 5.47*** (.67) .71 (.58) 
cut4 5.86*** (.68) 5.53*** (.59) 4.47*** (.56) 5.15*** (.56) 6.33*** (.60) 6.75*** (.60) 6.86*** (.63) 6.58*** (.70) 1.43* (.59) 
F-Statistic 5.54*** 5.62*** 3.92*** 4.52*** 9.57*** 7.85*** 5.42*** 3.85*** 5.21*** 
Observations 2208.07 2209.31 2209.31 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 
Logistic regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of multiply 
imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variable scale: 0 (Not all likely), .25 (A little likely), .5 (Moderately likely), .75 (Very likely), 1 (Extremely likely). + p 
< .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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The first set models explain willingness for future participation by respondents of 
the 2008-09 ANES Panel Study with standard specifications of predictors. Table 9 
contains the model estimates with dependent variables for participation in specific 
activities. The results show that racial and ethnic differences in desires for participation 
remain despite the inclusion of variables that could have explained away differences 
between Blacks, Latinos, and Whites individually. Specifically, Blacks remained more 
willing than Whites to want to join protest actions, attend government and political 
meetings, invite others to the meetings, hand out information about the meetings, and 
make donations to religious groups. Latinos were similarly enthusiastic about engaging in 
protest action, signing petitions, handing out information, and making religious 
donations. For both, positive correlations indicate that that openness to future 
participation is largely explained by a regard for their identification with Black and 
Latino communities that were somehow emboldened. 
Models in Table 9 also present coefficients for two measures of risk attitudes as 
covariates indicating that people that were emboldened toward uncertainty were more 
willing to take part in non-electoral activities. A positive relationship between 
participation and the Risk Orientation Scale (ROS) was established by Kam (2012) and 
affirmed by these data. Risk accepting members of the public were more willing than risk 
averse peers to desire to be engaged in every activity, with the exception of religious 
donations. The ROS’s dominating focus is comfort with uncertainty relating to lifestyle 
decisions such as gambling, seeking new experiences, and having unpredictable friends. 
A prior conclusion from the ROS’s association with participation is that the public’s 
pursuit for novelty is compatible with non-electoral politics because they are new, 
exciting, and offer new living conditions. The Risk Propensity Scale (RPS) also captures 
comfort with uncertainty but on an alternative set of components relating to risks over 
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quality of life such as health, safety, and knowing what is going to happen (Meerterns et 
al. 2008). High values of the RPS are similarly predictive of openness to non-electoral 
participation, though positive effects do not include attending government meetings or 
signing petitions. The two measures of risk attitudes emerge as predictive, so a multi-
pronged approach can provide multiple possibilities to evaluate non-white participation. 
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Black -.99 (1.13) -1.11 (1.22) -2.10+ (1.13) -1.37 (1.03) -1.17 (1.40) -1.43 (1.04) -2.00 (1.34) -.82 (1.23) -.15 (1.17) 
Latino 1.45 (1.77) -.85 (1.54) 1.17 (1.42) .19 (1.42) -1.29 (1.80) -.43 (1.56) -1.34 (1.61) -4.46** (1.6) -.47 (1.56) 
Other -3.15 (2.71) -2.30 (1.91) -2.47 (1.53) -2.05 (2.10) -2.53 (1.96) -.94 (1.81) .31 (1.75) -.88 (1.79) -2.23 (1.67) 
RPS .06 (.08) -.08 (.08) -.06 (.07) -.08 (.07) .10 (.07) .08 (.07) .10 (.08) .12 (.08) -.10 (.07) 
Black # RPS -.06 (.17) .31 (.23) .13 (.21) .08 (.26) -.16 (.21) -.17 (.22) -.15 (.25) -.28 (.22) -.16 (.18) 
Latino # RPS .61* (.24) .59* (.24) .21 (.30) .21 (.30) .60* (.29) .72** (.23) .81*** (.20) 1.01*** (.23) -.32 (.25) 
Other # RPS -.15 (.47) .45 (.48) .21 (.36) .27 (.46) .29 (.61) -.11 (.45) -.27 (.41) -.28 (.34) .38 (.35) 
ROS .41* (.16) .36** (.13) .29* (.12) .32** (.12) .15 (.13) .39** (.13) .43** (.13) .31* (.15) -.28* (.13) 
Black # ROS .52 (.35) .24 (.42) .57 (.35) .41 (.36) .62 (.42) .86* (.36) 1.07** (.40) .77+ (.42) .49 (.35) 
Latino # ROS -.85 (.55) -.29 (.51) -.43 (.38) -.08 (.41) -.10 (.47) -.51 (.51) -.32 (.48) .44 (.48) .65+ (.38) 
Other # ROS 1.13 (.93) .21 (.68) .56 (.55) .17 (.87) .53 (.78) .42 (.62) .17 (.56) .56 (.50) .35 (.53) 
Age -.11* (.05) .07 (.05) -.03 (.04) .21*** (.05) .18*** (.04) .17*** (.05) .06 (.05) .04 (.05) .09* (.04) 
Income -.05 (.05) .09* (.05) .12* (.05) .06 (.05) .14*** (.04) .02 (.05) -.02 (.05) -.01 (.05) .13* (.05) 
Education .27*** (.07) .28*** (.06) .15** (.06) .16** (.06) .43*** (.05) .36*** (.06) .23*** (.06) .13* (.06) .11+ (.06) 
Female -.11 (.12) .02 (.11) .21* (.11) .16 (.11) .32** (.11) .11 (.11) .10 (.12) .09 (.12) .23* (.11) 
Foreign Born .46+ (.26) .34 (.27) .41+ (.24) .37+ (.20) .34 (.25) .27 (.25) .27 (.23) .51* (.23) -.43+ (.26) 
Party ID -.01 (.04) -.03 (.04) -.02 (.03) -.02 (.04) -.01 (.04) -.02 (.03) -.04 (.04) -.00 (.04) .10* (.04) 
Ideology .02 (.04) .06 (.04) .01 (.04) .04 (.04) .00 (.05) .03 (.05) .06 (.06) .02 (.06) .07 (.04) 
cut1 2.63*** (.71) 1.64** (.61) 1.25* (.55) 1.18* (.55) 2.70*** (.59) 2.92*** (.62) 3.09*** (.64) 2.99*** (.72) -1.01+ (.60) 
cut2 3.51*** (.72) 2.97*** (.62) 2.25*** (.55) 2.54*** (.56) 3.93*** (.60) 4.14*** (.62) 4.23*** (.64) 4.10*** (.73) -.38 (.60) 
cut3 4.78*** (.72) 4.00*** (.62) 3.23*** (.55) 3.70*** (.56) 5.17*** (.60) 5.32*** (.63) 5.40*** (.64) 5.11*** (.73) .33 (.60) 
cut4 5.78*** (.74) 5.16*** (.64) 4.21*** (.57) 4.88*** (.58) 6.07*** (.61) 6.54*** (.64) 6.59*** (.66) 6.24*** (.75) 1.05+ (.60) 
F-Statistic 4.78*** 4.50*** 3.24*** 3.38*** 6.64*** 6.25*** 5.12*** 4.54*** 3.73*** 
Observations 2208.07 2209.31 2209.31 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 2212.41 
Logistic regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of multiply imputed 
data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variable scale: 0 (Not all likely), .25 (A little likely), .5 (Moderately likely), .75 (Very likely), 1 (Extremely likely). + p < .10, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Predicted probabilities presented generated by marginal predictions of models in previous tables. Entries represent cumulative 
probabilities of respondents answering “moderately likely,” “very likely,” or “extremely likely” (compared to “a little likely” 
and “not at all likely”) to queries of future political participation. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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I rely on both the RPS and ROS to consider whether risk attitudes affect the 
relationship between race and ethnicity and willingness to engage in non-electoral 
participation. Subsequent models presented in Table 10 employ interactions testing 
whether the positive effects of the RPS and ROS for Black and Latino participation are 
significantly different from effects for Whites. The goal of this approach is to determine 
whether Black and Latino willingness for participation that often exceeds Whites is due 
to high values of the RPS and ROS, or risk acceptance. 
Estimates contained in Table 10 yield that ROS risk acceptance is common 
among Blacks surpassing Whites in reporting high likelihood of attending political 
meetings, inviting others to those meetings, and distributing information. The results 
indicate that Blacks were more represented than Whites among ROS risk-accepting 
respondents stating a high likelihood of future involvement. Table 11 contains predicted 
probabilities of respondents reporting the affirmative responses Moderately, Very, and 
Extremely likely for a unit change in the RPS and ROS. The second section shows that 
the ROS was encouraging to Whites and Blacks but particularly empowering for Blacks 
on group organization activity. In particular, a unit increase in the ROS yielded an 
estimated 29, 33, and 20 percent gain in the probabilities of Blacks attending political 
meetings, inviting others, and handout information compared to just 8, 7, and 4 percent 
probability changes for Whites. Graph 8 contains illustrations of the effects for every 
level of the ROS indicating differences between Whites and Blacks, demonstrating that 
Blacks grew far more likely than Whites to report being likely to engage in the actions as 
ROS increased in value. 
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Graph 8: Risk Orientation Scale and Future Participation Probabilities for Whites, Blacks 
A notable finding from the racial and ethnic disaggregation of the effects of the 
ROS is that the scale has no effect on involvement among Latinos. The ROS’s positive 
effects on non-electoral participation evident in standard models in Table 9 therefore do 
not apply to Latinos. If the ROS were the only measure of risk attitudes, then the puzzle 
of Latino intended participation would remain unanswered. Here, my addition of the RPS 
shows that risk acceptance is indeed associated with heightened Latino participation and 
that significant differences with Whites emerge because the RPS is ineffective among 
Whites. Interaction coefficients in Table 10 show that increased RPS risk acceptance by 
Latinos generated more willingness for participation than it did for Whites on joining 
protests, attending government meetings, making political donations, attending political 
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solo labeled “RPS” of Table 10, which represent the effects on participation among 
Whites, show no risk effects. Predicted probability estimates in Table 8-2 show that 
Latinos benefited from the RPS as probabilities of desired involvement increased by 11 
to 16 for the activities on average, while remaining mostly unchanged for Whites (with 
the exception of 2-3 percent increases on a handful of activities that I do not consider 
given a lack of significance of coefficients in the main models). 
 
Graph 9: Risk Propensity Scale and Future Participation Probabilities for Whites, Latinos 
Graph 9 contains illustrations of predicted probability estimates for Whites and 
Latinos throughout the course of the RPS. As with Blacks in select activities with the 
ROS shown in Graph 8, distributions of probabilities for the six activities presented show 
Latinos reporting increased likelihoods of participation. Firstly, risk accepting Latinos 
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values of the RPS) to have reported positive responses toward desiring to be involved. 
This positive trend interacts with the slope of the effect of the RPS for White 
participation by initially showing no differences at low values. The relationship then 
diverges at high values, where risk-accepting Latinos report being more likely than risk- 
accepting Whites to want to be involved.  
The results for Latinos in Graph 9 also show that standard errors for Latino 
respondents are wide at high values of the RPS, indicating that true values lay somewhere 
within the bands and some slight overlap with estimates for Whites. These occurrences 
are due to the low number of Latino respondents in the survey in general and at higher 
values of the RPS specifically. For this reason, I refrain from interpreting Latino-White 
differences at particular points of the RPS. And yet, the RPS yields a positive trend for 
Latino participation similar to observations for Blacks with the ROS. So risk acceptance 
indeed encouraged Black and Latino future involvement in ways it did not encourage it 
for White respondents. 
Prior Participation 
Cross tabulations of prior participation in the measurements section suggested that 
Blacks and Latinos differed from Whites in the negative direction with the exception of 
some activities. Many negative differences did not reach statistical significance, however, 
with the exception of Blacks having made political donations and Latinos attending 
government meetings and signing petitions online. Positive differences were also 
apparent with Blacks having invited others to political meetings and Latinos attending 
protest actions at greater rates than Whites. So the analysis of prior participation contains 
evidence of minority participation at higher and lower rates. The following considers 
whether risk attitudes explain this mixed bag of participation. 
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Black .48* (.24) .01 (.25) .02 (.22) .03 (.26) -.14 (.24) .36 (.23) .68** (.25) .59* (.24) .83* (.39) 
Latino 1.04*** (.28) .00 (.27) -.62* (.26) .26 (.34) .02 (.29) .35 (.31) .41 (.32) .26 (.33) .30 (.36) 
Other .40 (.35) -.49 (.37) .12 (.34) -.84* (.34) .21 (.36) -.00 (.33) .13 (.39) .58+ (.34) -.03 (.47) 
RPS .12 (.08) .08 (.08) .04 (.07) .04 (.10) .14+ (.08) .20* (.08) .21* (.08) .16* (.08) -.11 (.12) 
ROS .26+ (.14) .42** (.13) .29* (.12) .24 (.16) .37** (.13) .33** (.12) .47** (.15) .39** (.14) -.00 (.21) 
Age .14* (.06) .45*** (.05) -.03 (.05) .29*** (.06) .26*** (.05) .40*** (.05) .27*** (.06) .40*** (.06) .31*** (.07) 
Income .03 (.06) .08 (.06) .20*** (.05) .18** (.06) .19*** (.05) .08 (.05) .09 (.06) .07 (.06) .18* (.08) 
Education .35*** (.07) .43*** (.07) .18** (.06) .30*** (.08) .54*** (.07) .37*** (.06) .20** (.07) .18* (.07) .23* (.10) 
Female -.11 (.13) .25+ (.13) .32** (.12) .06 (.15) .12 (.13) .02 (.13) -.01 (.14) .05 (.14) .35+ (.18) 
Foreign Born .39 (.32) .19 (.34) .54+ (.31) -.21 (.33) -.60* (.29) -.21 (.31) -.06 (.32) -.14 (.27) -.59 (.41) 
Party ID .00 (.04) -.04 (.04) .04 (.05) .03 (.05) -.01 (.06) -.02 (.05) -.02 (.05) .04 (.04) .08 (.08) 
Ideology -.04 (.06) .10* (.05) -.05 (.06) -.04 (.07) -.01 (.06) .01 (.06) .03 (.06) -.00 (.05) .07 (.07) 
Constant -3.98*** (.8) -4.13*** (.7) -3.03*** (.6) -1.65* (.8) -3.42*** (.7) -3.93*** (.7) -4.96*** (.8) -4.85*** (.8) -.16 (.9) 
F-Statistic 5.54*** 10.17*** 6.04*** 5.04*** 10.72*** 9.58*** 5.10*** 5.24*** 3.41*** 
Observations 2385.42 2385.94 2385.94 2385.94 2385.74 2385.94 2385.94 2385.94 2385.94 
Odds ratios presented, standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of multiply imputed data for explanatory 
variables only. Dependent variable is a binary of 0 (Never have done this) to 1 (Have done this). + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 12 includes logistic regression models explaining dependent variables with 
0 (“Have not done this”) or 1 (“Have done this”) responses to specific activity questions. 
The regression models are consistent with the cross tabulations as well as provide new 
information about minority involvement. All things considered, Latinos were indeed 
more likely to have reported participation in protest activity while less likely to have 
signed petitions online. The models also showed high levels of Black protest actions, 
inviting others to political meetings, handing out meeting information, and making 
religious donations more than Whites in or prior to 2008. The regression models appear 
to have brought to the fore the mobilizing effect of Black identity, while Latinos 
participation rates remained unchanged with the inclusion of additional mitigating 
factors, including risk attitudes. 
Both measures of risk attitudes, RPS and ROS, remained as predictive of prior 
participation as they were with future participation models. In Table 9-1, the ROS 
positively explains having taking part in every participatory action except signing a 
petition and making religious donations. RPS associations were fewer, limited to political 
donations, attending political meetings, inviting others to meetings, and handing out 
information. The previous section showed that Blacks and Latinos were responsible for a 
good deal of the positive effects of the RPS and ROS with future participation. Whether 
and to what degree are these positive associations between risk and prior participation 
shared by minorities?  
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Black 1.23 (1.22) -1.97 (1.64) -1.47 (1.25) -1.92 (1.42) -1.07 (1.43) -.28 (1.52) .69 (1.30) -.13 (1.29) 2.02 (2.43) 
Latino -.76 (1.78) -2.73+ (1.5) -3.11+ (1.8) .74 (2.34) -1.96 (1.86) 3.01 (2.10) 1.38 (2.63) -3.29 (2.64) 2.28 (2.26) 
Other -.85 (2.42) -1.35 (2.70) -3.26+ (1.9) -.85 (2.35) -3.97 (3.17) -1.10 (2.02) .73 (2.64) -.13 (2.54) -.25 (2.24) 
RPS .04 (.08) .03 (.09) .01 (.08) .07 (.10) .11 (.08) .17* (.08) .16+ (.09) .06 (.08) -.06 (.12) 
Black # RPS .03 (.25) .07 (.26) .23 (.22) .04 (.28) .08 (.24) .11 (.23) .03 (.23) .28 (.23) -.14 (.33) 
Latino # RPS .49 (.33) .45 (.31) -.23 (.30) -.48 (.39) .11 (.39) -.03 (.40) .48 (.41) .55 (.47) -.30 (.42) 
Other # RPS .52 (.52) -.11 (.50) .52 (.50) .41 (.45) .74 (.58) .75+ (.46) .01 (.57) .15 (.49) .18 (.53) 
ROS .30* (.14) .31* (.15) .17 (.14) .16 (.17) .27+ (.14) .40** (.13) .56*** (.15) .38** (.14) .05 (.22) 
Black # ROS -.26 (.41) .56 (.49) .24 (.40) .59 (.49) .21 (.46) .09 (.45) -.03 (.40) -.05 (.37) -.23 (.72) 
Latino # ROS .05 (.49) .39 (.44) .97+ (.58) .36 (.68) .49 (.47) -.80 (.62) -.79 (.74) .49 (.73) -.29 (.73) 
Other # ROS -.10 (.75) .36 (.85) .57 (.58) -.37 (.78) .63 (.96) -.36 (.56) -.21 (.80) .06 (.76) -.09 (.69) 
Age .15** (.06) .44*** (.05) -.04 (.05) .28*** (.06) .26*** (.05) .40*** (.05) .28*** (.06) .40*** (.07) .31*** (.07) 
Income .03 (.06) .09 (.06) .20*** (.05) .17** (.06) .19*** (.05) .08 (.05) .10+ (.06) .07 (.06) .18* (.08) 
Education .36*** (.07) .44*** (.07) .19** (.06) .30*** (.08) .56*** (.07) .37*** (.06) .20** (.07) .19** (.07) .23* (.10) 
Female -.12 (.13) .24+ (.13) .31* (.12) .07 (.15) .11 (.13) .03 (.13) -.01 (.14) .04 (.13) .36* (.18) 
Foreign Born .39 (.33) .20 (.34) .55+ (.32) -.22 (.32) -.63* (.30) -.20 (.31) -.04 (.32) -.13 (.28) -.61 (.42) 
Party ID .00 (.05) -.04 (.04) .04 (.05) .03 (.05) -.01 (.06) -.02 (.05) -.02 (.05) .04 (.04) .08 (.09) 
Ideology -.04 (.06) .10* (.05) -.05 (.06) -.05 (.07) -.01 (.06) .01 (.05) .03 (.06) -.00 (.05) .06 (.07) 
Constant -3.91*** (.8) -3.67*** (.7) -2.51*** (.7) -1.45+ (.8) -2.98*** (.7) -4.09*** (.7) -5.17*** (.8) -4.53*** (.8) -.49 (.99) 
F-Statistic 3.71*** 7.09*** 4.71*** 3.60*** 6.91*** 7.29*** 3.91*** 3.17*** 2.37*** 
Observations 2385.42 2385.94 2385.94 2385.94 2385.74 2385.94 2385.94 2385.94 2385.94 
Odds ratios presented, standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of multiply imputed data for explanatory 
variables only. Dependent variable is a binary of 0 (Never have done this) to 1 (Have done this). + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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I tested interactions between race and ethnicity and risk attitudes with the RPS 
and ROS to see whether effects were present among Blacks and Latinos and whether 
these associations differed significantly from those of Whites In Table 14. Such 
differences with Whites was not found, indicating that the RPS and ROS among Blacks 
and Latinos did not outperform Whites. The only exception was that Latinos who were 
risk accepting were more likely to have signed petitions online than were White peers. 
Latinos were generally less likely to participate in this activity compared to Whites, but 
this deficit was undercut by risk attitudes. 



































































































































































Predicted probabilities presented generated by marginal predictions of additive and multiplicative models in previous tables. 
Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study. Weighted analysis of multiply imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent 
variable is a binary of 0 (Never have done this) to 1 (Have done this). + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Finer evaluations of risk attitude effects are possible with predicted probabilities 
presented in Table 14. The statistics are average changes in predicted probabilities of 
respondents saying they “Have done this” per one-unit change in RPS or ROS. Entries 
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largely show that ROS’s positive effects principally reflect White respondents, who were 
between 5 and 10 percent more likely to have reported being involved with increased risk 
acceptance. Blacks and Latinos saw increases in attending government meetings with the 
ROS, while Latino risk acceptance also led to more signing petitions online and making 
political donations. Effects for minorities are large enough to constitute statistically 
significant differences between, say, risk-averse Latinos and risk-accepting Latinos, but 
there is no evidence here that minority risk attitudes are significantly different from 
Whites. 
The RPS was influential among Latinos with future participation but it is also 
seemingly irrelevant to prior participation. Aggregate models show that the RPS shapes 
group organization activity, but those results are reduced to positive effects for Whites on 
attending political meetings and inviting others to those meetings. Latinos with RPS 
values also gravitated toward attending protest actions but the effect is significant at 90% 
and not significantly different from Whites, whose RPS had no bearing on the activity.  
All told, the results draw the picture that risk attitudes are a driver of political 
participation that has occurred. Risk acceptance is a common characteristic of 
participants in the various activities, while significantly lower values of the RPS and ROS 
were apparent with non-participants. The intuition applies to the public at-large but is 
also isolated to White respondents. Risk attitudes are positively associated with three 
activities for Latinos and just one for Blacks, and those effects are only significant at the 
90% level so their statistical significance is not entirely certain. 
Such limited evidence for risk attitudes on Black and Latino prior participation is 
in contrast to the concept’s positive and sizeable influence on desiring to take part in 
future involvement. Why the discrepancy? Majorities of Blacks and Latinos have perhaps 
not had the opportunity to become politically involved after becoming emboldened 
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toward political action. When non-whites have participated, does risk acceptance of 
participants continue to explain heightened likelihoods of future participation? If so, risk 
attitudes might emerge as integral to the entirety of minority non-electoral participation 
from genesis (or the desire to be involved) to fruition (having been involved). But if risk 
attitudes are only predictive of future participation among non-participating Blacks and 
Latinos, it might also be that risk acceptance encourages openness to political action but 
is insufficient to encourage following through to participation. If so, external factors like 
mobilization might be required to encourage participation among already receptive 
audiences. 
Risk Attitudes and Future Participation Conditional on Prior Participation 
Here I test whether willingness for participation that is coupled with risk attitudes 
depends on whether participants avoided or took part in the activities in the past. This is 
intended to determine whether risk attitudes permeate the entirety of the non-electoral 
participation process, beginning with desire for involvement and culminating with 
involvement, or whether risk attitudes simply open up individuals to political action. 
Below I present models explaining willingness for participatory activities in the future 
that are subset by whether or not respondents participated in those activities in the past. I 
consider models specified by standard variables and with interactions to determine 
effectiveness of RPS and ROS measures in general, as well as variable interactions 
testing Black and Latino differences with Whites. 
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Table 15: Predictors of Future Participation by Previous Participation, Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates 
 Protest, Rally Gov. Meeting Sign E-Petition Sign Petition 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Black .67** (.25) -.07 (.29) .91* (.36) .61* (.24) .00 (.30) .21 (.30) -.12 (.40) .32 (.21) 
Latino .33 (.40) .59 (.42) .84* (.41) -.24 (.26) 1.13*** (.33) .11 (.36) .31 (.56) .68** (.23) 
Other -.04 (.50) -.16 (.37) -.19 (.47) -.03 (.36) -.41 (.43) -.03 (.41) -1.01* (.44) .04 (.44) 
RPS .14 (.09) -.03 (.12) .16 (.13) -.10 (.09) .03 (.09) -.18+ (.10) -.05 (.14) -.10 (.08) 
ROS .24 (.18) .77*** (.22) .11 (.26) .41** (.13) .24 (.17) .37* (.19) .07 (.21) .48*** (.12) 
Age -.24*** (.07) -.05 (.09) .00 (.09) -.17** (.06) -.09 (.06) .10 (.07) -.00 (.09) .19*** (.05) 
Income -.09 (.07) -.03 (.08) .05 (.09) .05 (.05) -.04 (.07) .06 (.06) -.07 (.10) -.00 (.05) 
Education .22* (.09) -.08 (.10) .28* (.11) .12+ (.06) .02 (.08) .17* (.08) .06 (.12) .04 (.06) 
Female -.05 (.16) -.11 (.21) .26 (.21) -.20 (.13) -.00 (.15) .20 (.16) -.02 (.25) .20+ (.12) 
Foreign Born .30 (.37) .34 (.39) .04 (.47) .36 (.24) .46 (.47) .17 (.35) .97** (.32) .38+ (.22) 
Party ID .02 (.06) .02 (.06) .02 (.07) -.00 (.04) -.02 (.06) -.06 (.06) -.04 (.09) -.01 (.04) 
Ideology .01 (.05) .02 (.07) .02 (.09) -.00 (.05) -.02 (.08) .08 (.06) .06 (.11) .02 (.05) 
cut1 2.14* (.89) 1.37 (1.08) 2.11* (1.05) -.58 (.63) 1.01 (.91) -.70 (.77) 1.10 (1.12) .16 (.58) 
cut2 3.05*** (.90) 2.58* (1.09) 3.48** (1.07) 1.06+ (.64) 2.05* (.92) 1.18 (.77) 2.37* (1.13) 2.05*** (.58) 
cut3 4.52*** (.90) 3.94*** (1.10) 4.93*** (1.07) 2.13*** (.64) 3.53*** (.91) 2.24** (.78) 3.85*** (1.12) 3.34*** (.59) 
cut4 5.45*** (.91) 4.95*** (1.13) 6.23*** (1.19) 3.30*** (.65) 4.67*** (.95) 3.38*** (.80) 4.83*** (1.16) 4.60*** (.61) 
F-Statistic 3.53*** 2.76*** 1.68+ 4.45*** 1.80* 1.75+ 1.45 3.60*** 
Observations 1795.51m 586.18 910.14 1472.77 1407.73 975.17 663.14 1722.80 
Logistic regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of 
multiply imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variable scale: 0 (Not all likely), .25 (A little likely), .5 (Moderately likely), .75 (Very likely), 1 
(Extremely likely). + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 16: Predictors of Future Participation by Previous Participation, Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates 
 Pol. Donation Pol. Meeting Pol. Invite Others Pol. Handout 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Black .89** (.29) .06 (.25) .66* (.32) .80*** (.23) .73* (.29) .83** (.30) .54+ (.30) .68* (.28) 
Latino .81* (.35) .21 (.35) .34 (.33) .10 (.33) .30 (.31) .21 (.39) .39 (.33) .70+ (.39) 
Other .08 (.57) -.01 (.34) .36 (.39) -.37 (.54) .20 (.35) -.30 (.50) -.03 (.39) -.35 (.49) 
RPS .15 (.10) .02 (.10) .08 (.12) -.01 (.10) .09 (.10) .04 (.12) .15 (.11) .02 (.11) 
ROS -.04 (.21) .19 (.14) .40+ (.20) .44*** (.13) .36* (.16) .30 (.22) .36* (.17) .42* (.20) 
Age .05 (.08) .06 (.05) -.05 (.07) .07 (.06) -.08 (.06) -.04 (.07) -.20** (.07) -.11 (.09) 
Income .02 (.08) .04 (.05) -.07 (.08) -.01 (.05) -.12+ (.07) -.07 (.07) -.16* (.07) .06 (.07) 
Education .07 (.10) .32*** (.06) .26** (.09) .20** (.07) .21** (.08) .08 (.09) .12 (.08) -.16+ (.09) 
Female .21 (.19) .30* (.12) .12 (.18) .01 (.14) .03 (.15) .22 (.19) -.01 (.17) .30 (.18) 
Foreign Born .87+ (.47) .47+ (.28) .43 (.33) .50 (.37) .09 (.29) 1.08*** (.32) .88* (.37) .33 (.33) 
Party ID .01 (.05) .02 (.05) .01 (.05) .00 (.04) -.04 (.05) .05 (.09) -.01 (.06) .01 (.06) 
Ideology .07 (.09) -.06 (.06) -.01 (.07) .02 (.06) .06 (.07) -.06 (.10) -.00 (.09) .01 (.07) 
cut1 2.74** (1.00) .37 (.68) 2.68** (.85) .99 (.76) 2.32** (.79) .43 (1.02) 2.82** (.93) .40 (.93) 
cut2 4.13*** (1.02) 2.04** (.69) 3.91*** (.86) 2.70*** (.77) 3.68*** (.79) 2.08* (1.01) 4.21*** (.93) 1.77+ (.94) 
cut3 6.12*** (1.06) 3.31*** (.69) 5.46*** (.88) 3.91*** (.77) 5.35*** (.80) 3.34** (1.01) 5.80*** (.95) 2.82** (.95) 
cut4 7.02*** (1.15) 4.31*** (.70) 7.19*** (1.01) 5.15*** (.80) 6.43*** (.83) 4.70*** (1.03) 6.54*** (1.08) 4.16*** (.97) 
F-Statistic 1.66+ 4.48*** 2.02* 2.84*** 2.17* 3.28*** 2.81*** 2.90*** 
Observations 1160.33 1225.41 1281.75 1104.19 1776.11 609.83 1755.84 630.10 
Logistic regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of 
multiply imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variable scale: 0 (Not all likely), .25 (A little likely), .5 (Moderately likely), .75 (Very likely), 1 
(Extremely likely). + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Tests for future participation activities by respondent prior participation are 
contained in two parts in Tables 15 and 16. The models presented are outlined in two 
columns per dependent variables, the first being tests among respondents that were 
previously not involved in an activity and the second among those stating prior 
involvement. These models show that Blacks were consistently more likely than Whites 
to report greater willingness for participation regardless of previous involvement. Latinos 
reported greater rates of desired participation with Whites on attending government 
meetings, signing petitions online, and making political donations, but only when Latinos 
had not been involved in the activities in the past, with the exception of signing petitions. 
So it is apparent that Blacks and Latinos differ from Whites in intended participation, but 
for different reasons. Both appear to be responding to some groundswell of motivation 
for political participation, as Blacks exhibited strong general encouragement, but only 
inexperienced Latinos shared the sentiment. 
The RPS and ROS also exhibit similar contextual effects based on previous 
participation. First, ROS, which had sweeping influence in future participation earlier, is 
now shown to yield its motivating potential mainly among respondents reporting prior 
participation. So the ROS risk accepting were fairly consistent about stating a desire for 
future participation after being involved in those activities. This result is consistent for 
the entirety of non-electoral participation, from desiring to becoming involved, because 
ROS risk acceptance not only motivates participants, it is also instrumental in keeping 
them engaged.  
Below, I test whether such relationships apply to Black and Latino respondents. 
But beforehand, it is important to note that the RPS loses statistical power across the 
models subset by previous participation. The RPS was a mainstay for Latino participation 
in previous models. Subsequent tests weigh whether Latinos continue to rely on the RPS 
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to state intentions for participation and whether its effects are significantly different from 
Whites. 
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Table 17: Predictors of Future Participation by Previous Participation, Race/Ethnicity Moderated by Risk Attitudes, Ordered Logistic 
Regression Estimates 
 Protest, Rally Gov. Meeting Sign E-Petition Sign Petition 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Black -2.08 (1.51) .14 (1.59) -2.00 (2.77) -.10 (1.41) -2.17 (2.14) -.86 (1.59) -1.10 (2.45) -.38 (.95) 
Latino 3.53 (2.37) 1.05 (3.23) .01 (3.04) -.18 (1.26) 2.65 (2.07) 2.31 (1.83) 4.29+ (2.41) -1.61 (1.47) 
Other -9.78+ (5.80) .83 (2.58) -1.15 (1.73) -2.59 (1.84) 1.75 (2.25) -3.60 (2.29) -2.92 (3.26) -3.18 (2.02) 
RPS .09 (.10) -.05 (.13) -.07 (.13) -.16 (.10) .06 (.10) -.30** (.11) -.11 (.16) -.18* (.09) 
Black # RPS -.00 (.23) -.09 (.26) .58 (.36) .02 (.34) -.15 (.29) .53 (.47) .09 (.34) .21 (.28) 
Latino # RPS .71* (.36) .36 (.44) .88 (.53) .26 (.28) .20 (.45) .30 (.34) 1.00 (.67) .48 (.34) 
Other # RPS .71 (.82) -.70+ (.36) .05 (.44) 1.01* (.43) -.74+ (.42) .46 (.59) .16 (.55) .10 (.78) 
ROS .17 (.21) .86*** (.23) .08 (.29) .42** (.14) .22 (.18) .37* (.19) .19 (.29) .44** (.13) 
Black # ROS .85+ (.46) .03 (.51) .39 (.98) .20 (.42) .84 (.69) -.19 (.79) .24 (.77) .02 (.35) 
Latino # ROS -1.77* (.84) -.51 (.81) -.67 (1.10) -.28 (.49) -.70 (.71) -.90 (.62) -2.43* (1.04) .24 (.33) 
Other # ROS 2.29 (1.56) .36 (.68) .21 (.66) -.15 (.51) -.04 (.66) .64 (1.00) .38 (1.19) .91 (.96) 
Age -.25*** (.07) -.03 (.10) -.03 (.09) -.17** (.06) -.09 (.06) .10 (.07) -.02 (.10) .19*** (.05) 
Income -.07 (.07) -.01 (.08) .05 (.09) .05 (.05) -.03 (.07) .08 (.06) -.05 (.10) .01 (.05) 
Education .26** (.09) -.06 (.10) .30** (.11) .12+ (.06) .02 (.08) .18* (.08) .11 (.12) .04 (.06) 
Female -.04 (.16) -.11 (.21) .20 (.21) -.20 (.13) -.02 (.16) .17 (.16) -.01 (.25) .19 (.12) 
Foreign Born .38 (.32) .32 (.39) .16 (.46) .40+ (.24) .30 (.44) .07 (.34) 1.03** (.36) .43+ (.22) 
Party ID .01 (.05) .01 (.06) .02 (.07) -.00 (.04) -.02 (.06) -.06 (.07) -.07 (.09) -.01 (.04) 
Ideology .02 (.05) .03 (.07) .02 (.09) -.00 (.05) -.02 (.08) .08 (.07) .09 (.12) .03 (.05) 
cut1 1.93* (.89) 1.73 (1.12) 1.37 (1.27) -.69 (.66) .90 (.86) -1.13 (.82) 1.44 (1.28) -.15 (.63) 
cut2 2.87** (.90) 2.96** (1.12) 2.78* (1.28) .96 (.66) 1.96* (.87) .77 (.82) 2.76* (1.29) 1.74** (.63) 
cut3 4.39*** (.91) 4.33*** (1.14) 4.26** (1.30) 2.03** (.67) 3.45*** (.87) 1.85* (.82) 4.28** (1.31) 3.05*** (.63) 
cut4 5.35*** (.94) 5.35*** (1.17) 5.59*** (1.38) 3.21*** (.68) 4.59*** (.91) 3.00*** (.84) 5.25*** (1.35) 4.31*** (.65) 
F-Statistic 3.11*** 2.31** 1.67* 3.45*** 1.94* 1.89* 1.13 2.74*** 
Observations 1795.51 586.18 910.14 1472.77 1407.73 975.17 663.14 1722.80 
Logistic regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of multiply 
imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variable scale: 0 (Not all likely), .25 (A little likely), .5 (Moderately likely), .75 (Very likely), 1 (Extremely likely). 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 18: Predictors of Future Participation by Previous Participation, Race/Ethnicity Moderated by Risk Attitudes, Ordered Logistic 
Regression Estimates 
 Pol. Donation Pol. Meeting Pol. Invite Others Pol. Handout 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Black -3.78* (1.72) .82 (1.91) -2.50 (2.28) -.13 (1.08) -3.47 (2.38) .88 (1.41) -1.37 (2.11) .06 (1.42) 
Latino -2.24 (2.17) 2.54 (2.52) -1.28 (1.94) -2.32 (2.18) -.40 (2.17) -5.56* (2.24) -4.05+ (2.24) -.67 (2.81) 
Other -4.38 (3.86) .53 (2.49) -1.19 (4.39) -.18 (1.57) -2.65 (2.29) 2.15 (2.09) -1.83 (2.01) -.39 (2.49) 
RPS .00 (.12) .07 (.09) -.01 (.11) -.00 (.09) .06 (.10) .01 (.16) .14 (.11) .07 (.13) 
Black # RPS .29 (.24) -.50 (.33) -.07 (.38) -.29 (.31) -.31 (.42) .02 (.32) -.66 (.43) -.41+ (.24) 
Latino # RPS .88* (.35) .24 (.38) .96** (.29) .33 (.36) .72+ (.37) .23 (.32) 1.25** (.43) .23 (.26) 
Other # RPS .60 (.88) -.18 (.74) -.87 (.86) .13 (.38) .39 (.54) -.63 (.49) -.28 (.44) -.48 (.70) 
ROS -.29 (.24) .24+ (.14) .28 (.23) .34* (.15) .21 (.18) .21 (.23) .18 (.20) .35+ (.21) 
Black # ROS 1.21* (.51) .25 (.62) 1.07 (.73) .58 (.38) 1.63* (.76) -.03 (.39) 1.19 (.76) .62 (.51) 
Latino # ROS .05 (.67) -.90 (.64) -.49 (.52) .42 (.57) -.50 (.61) 1.51* (.69) .06 (.66) .17 (.84) 
Other # ROS .84 (1.13) .01 (.86) 1.20 (1.24) -.17 (.40) .51 (.57) -.16 (.78) .78 (.58) .47 (.82) 
Age .05 (.08) .08 (.05) -.05 (.07) .07 (.06) -.08 (.06) -.06 (.06) -.20** (.07) -.10 (.09) 
Income .01 (.08) .05 (.05) -.05 (.08) -.00 (.05) -.11 (.07) -.07 (.07) -.15* (.07) .06 (.07) 
Education .11 (.10) .33*** (.06) .28** (.09) .21** (.07) .23** (.08) .09 (.09) .15+ (.08) -.16+ (.10) 
Female .15 (.19) .33** (.12) .12 (.18) .00 (.14) .04 (.15) .19 (.19) -.03 (.17) .28 (.18) 
Foreign Born .96* (.41) .48 (.30) .55+ (.32) .37 (.40) .15 (.28) .95** (.33) .95** (.32) .28 (.33) 
Party ID .00 (.05) .02 (.05) .01 (.05) -.00 (.05) -.05 (.05) .04 (.09) -.01 (.07) .00 (.06) 
Ideology .08 (.08) -.07 (.06) -.01 (.07) .02 (.06) .07 (.07) -.03 (.10) .00 (.10) .02 (.07) 
cut1 1.62+ (.97) .80 (.67) 2.24* (.89) .61 (.77) 1.87* (.78) -.13 (.96) 2.31* (.95) .34 (.98) 
cut2 3.06** (.99) 2.48*** (.68) 3.50*** (.90) 2.32** (.77) 3.27*** (.78) 1.55 (.96) 3.75*** (.97) 1.71+ (.99) 
cut3 5.09*** (1.03) 3.76*** (.68) 5.11*** (.93) 3.54*** (.78) 4.98*** (.79) 2.84** (.96) 5.44*** (.99) 2.78** (1.00) 
cut4 6.00*** (1.12) 4.77*** (.68) 6.87*** (1.02) 4.79*** (.80) 6.09*** (.83) 4.22*** (.99) 6.20*** (1.11) 4.14*** (1.03) 
F-Statistic 2.19*** 3.23*** 2.13** 2.26** 2.12** 2.99*** 3.10*** 1.95** 
Observations 1160.33 1225.41 1281.75 1104.19 1776.11 609.83 1755.84 630.10 
Logistic regression coefficients presented, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 2008-10 ANES Panel Study (Wave 17, May 2009). Weighted analysis of multiply 
imputed data for explanatory variables only. Dependent variable scale: 0 (Not all likely), .25 (A little likely), .5 (Moderately likely), .75 (Very likely), 1 (Extremely likely). 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Latino -.18+ .09 -.12 .03 -.12 -.10 -.32* .13* -.04 -.16 -.03 .19 -.03 .43* .02 .13 
Predicted probabilities presented generated by marginal predictions of models in previous tables. Entries represent cumulative probabilities of respondents 
answering “moderately likely,” “very likely,” or “extremely likely” (compared to “a little likely” and “not at all likely”) to queries of future political 
participation. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Models with interaction term coefficients are contained in Tables 17 and 18. The 
coefficients indicate that the RPS remains not only influential among Latinos, but 
specifically among Latinos that report no previous involvement. Risk accepting Latinos 
were more willing than White peers to report heightened desire for protest actions, 
political donations, attending political meetings, inviting others, and handing out political 
information. The ROS provides the same risk effect for Blacks who had not previously 
joined protest actions and made political donations.  
Table 19 shows predicted probability estimates of respondents reporting 
Moderately, Very, or Extremely likely to questions about future participation derived 
from the models in Tables 17 and 18. Increases in the RPS generated between 9 and 17 
percent gains in the probabilities of Latinos reporting affirmative responses. Non-
participating Blacks were also 16 and 17 percent more likely to report a desire to be 
involved, and rates significantly differ with Whites along the ROS. Predicted 
probabilities in Table 9 also show that influence on future participation by ROS is not 
only dominant among previous participants, but previous participants that are White. 
Increases in the ROS yielded between 6 and 21 percent estimates of heightened 
probabilities of future participation by White respondents. Probabilities by Blacks 
respondents reporting previous participation also increased with the ROS but on fewer 
participatory items. Latinos present an entirely different case, as outlined below. 
The evidence here expands on the notion that non-electoral participation is based 
on risk attitudes with important racial and ethnic differences by further noting that the 
results are specific to participatory contexts. Specifically, whether respondents were 
involved in the past will condition the effects of the risk attitude measures RPS and ROS. 
The ROS shows risk attitudes best permeates non-electoral involvement among Whites as 
accepting risk enables the public to overcome the costs associated with participation and 
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also to keep involved in the future. Minorities differ in this formulation since risk 
attitudes are influential on future Black and Latino participation but not capable of 
explaining participation in the past. So my question became whether risk attitudes 
remained predictive of future participation when minorities became politically engaged. 
The answer is “somewhat” for Blacks and “no” for Latinos. Black respondents, 
regardless of previous participation, relied on risk acceptance to report willingness to join 
protest actions, attend political meetings, and handout political information. To them, risk 
attitudes were a tool for mobilization for the involved and non-involved alike, so the 
likelihood of engagement by the previously non-engaged is likely inevitable. Latinos are 
quite different in that the risk accepting were the only ones reporting higher willingness 
for involvement, surpassing Whites, but only when previously uninvolved. On every 
political action except signing petitions and making religious donations, Latinos that were 
new to the experiences were optimistic about taking part, but a crucial node of 
mobilization appeared to be missing. If risk-accepting Latinos were driven toward non-
electoral political action, those that had been previously involved would have stated an 
interest in future involvement. So risk attitudes show that Latinos are capable of 
suppressing concerns about the costs associated with political participation, but the 




Chapter 4: Voting and Voter Mobilization: The Effect of Risk Attitudes 
on Latino Electoral Participation 
Characteristics like resources, psychological engagement, and mobilization are 
common among voters (Verba et al. 1995), although non-white minorities, and 
particularly Latinos, are disadvantaged across all three (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Pantoja 2005; Bowler and Segura 2012). This chapter considers 
how dispositions toward risk might serve as an indicator for psychological engagement, 
capturing variation in vote propensities and thereby helping to explain racial/ethnic gaps 
and non-gaps in voting. Chapter 3 uncovered links between risk acceptance and non-
electoral involvement consistent with those found by Kam (2012) and further discovered 
that Latinos are particularly emboldened to participation by risk acceptance, at times 
surpassing Whites. This chapter further expands the understanding of risk and 
participation by examining the link between risk acceptance and casting ballots. The 
latter activity is ritualistic, unspontaneous, and offers limited choice, so it might be 
unappealing to the risk accepting. Is voting therefore more common among risk averse 
respondents than among the risk accepting? As with non-electoral participation, do the 
mobilizing effects of risk attitudes differ among Whites and Latinos?  I therefore examine 
data from the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 CCES to more precisely test the link between 
voting and risk attitudes (involving personal finances). I find that the risk averse are more 
psychologically engaged in voting than are the risk accepting. Among the risk averse, 
Latinos voted as much or more than did Whites in midterm elections, while voting 
deficits emerged among the risk accepting. I also uncover that the link between voting 
and risk attitudes is conditional on voter mobilization, which has the greatest effect 
amongst risk-averse Latinos for both presidential and midterm elections. And since risk 
attitudes may be primed (Kam and Simas 2012), mobilization campaigns might screen 
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for risk attitudes and alter messaging to encourage recalcitrant risk-accepting Latinos to 
participate. 
INTRODUCTION 
Minority groups have voted at much lower rates than White Americans in general 
elections since the 1965 Voting Rights Act began to remove many longstanding legal 
barriers to participation. Barack Obama’s presidential campaigns were milestones for the 
Black electorate, as turnout rates matched and surpassed Whites in 2008 and 2012, but 
Latino voting was less affected. Less than one-in-two and less than one-in-three voting 
eligible Latino citizens voted in the presidential and midterm elections of that period (US 
Elections Project 2019). And gaps persisted in 2016 despite anti-immigrant sentiment 
rising from Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, with Latino voting returning to 2012 
levels (Krogstad and Lopez, 2017; Khalid 2016). The 2016 election suggests that Latino 
voting gaps are enduring and persist despite national-level politics that many thought 
would motivate Latino turnout. The task for researchers is to better understand the 
determinants of Latino turnout and to find new approaches that might encourage turnout 
despite the structural factors that dampen participation. 
What we know about getting citizens to vote involves the characteristics of 
individuals and their electoral environment. Voters tend to have the socioeconomic 
resources to vote, are mobilized by campaigns, and are psychologically engaged in the 
election (Verba et al. 1995). The disadvantages for racial and ethnic minority voters are 
considerable, as they lack socioeconomic resources; are less able to take time off from 
work to vote; selective mobilization by political campaigns overlooks minorities that are 
likely Democratic voters in urban areas; and minorities lag behind in aspects of 
psychological engagement, such as being politically informed. Latino voting is 
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particularly set back by language barriers, despite political campaigns hoping that Latinos 
will flock to candidates that make Spanish-language overtures (Bowler and Segura 2012). 
Latino voting increases with higher-quality outreach emphasizing interpersonal 
connections, but the process is resource and time intensive (García Bedolla and 
Michelson 2012). This chapter considers how drawing on risk attitudes can similarly 
improve Latino psychological engagement and thereby encourage voting. It tests whether 
voting differs among Latinos who are risk averse versus risk accepting, and whether such 
attitudes might be primed in a way that increases turnout.  
The concept of risk attitudes is an operationalization of principles advanced by 
prospect theory. With framing experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) uncovered 
that people decide to avoid or accept risks based on how the outcomes of problems are 
framed. If framed with the possibility of making gains, people choose the option that 
avoids risks in favor of the sure thing. If framed with the possibility of losses, people opt 
to accept risks in favor of the uncertainty that might prevent future losses. This difference 
in strategies is a result of unequal weighting of gains and losses, with people valuing the 
experience of a loss as more than an equivalent gain by virtue of cognitive bias. The 
cognitive patterns ought to matter to voting because it is often framed as an activity that 
can lead to potential gains, meaning it ought to be frequented by the risk averse. 
A link between the risk attitudes, either aversion or acceptance, and casting 
ballots is thus far unestablished but the activity is ritualistic, unspontaneous, and offers 
limited choice, so it might be unappealing to the risk accepting. I posit that the 
institutional nature of casting a ballot provides an outlet that is relatively low-cost, 
certain, and secure, thus appealing to risk avoiders but less so to the risk accepting, who 
frequent informal political outlets. The inclusion of racial/ethnic identity enables an 
analysis of whether the effect of risk attitudes on voting applies equally.  
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The chapter uses the 2010, 2012, and 2014 CCES panel that contains 9,500 
respondents as well as a 2016 University of Texas at Austin CCES with a smaller pool of 
respondents, containing a battery of custom measures. The dependent variables are 
measures of voting, both self-reported and validated record acquired by the CCES from 
country voter-files. The principal independent variable is the Risk Tolerance Scale, 
gauging willingness to risk degrees of current income (Barsky et al. 1997). 
As we will see, among the risk averse, Latino turnout is equal to or even greater 
than that of Whites in particular elections. By contrast, Latino voting lags behind that of 
Whites only for respondents who accept high degrees of risk. So with risk attitudes we 
see that national-level gaps in turnout showing Latinos at a disadvantage can be 
attributable in part to risk acceptance. Simultaneously, risk attitudes also yield that gaps 
with Whites also close due to high voting by risk averse Latinos. The findings propel the 
argument that risk attitudes may serve as an indicator for psychological engagement, 
primarily among Latinos, that political science may draw on to increase voting through 
priming experiments. Campaign contact is one form of priming that may be thought of as 
a natural experiment promoting voter participation by invitation or encouragement. I find 
that high voting by risk averse Latinos and low voting by risk accepting Latinos is 
exclusive to those contacted to vote. That is, mobilization messaging appears to have 
been compatible with the risk averse but not the risk accepting. I conclude that the effect 
of mobilization is not evenly distributed among Latinos spanning the risk attitudes 
spectrum. It appears that campaign contact is not very compatible with risk accepting 
Latinos, who might better respond to messages emphasizing potential losses rather than 
certain gains of voting. 
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LITERATURE AND EXPECTATIONS 
Risk attitudes emerged as an operationalization of prospect theory from 
disciplines like behavioral economics, finance, and cognitive psychology. The inclusion 
of such measures as explanatory variables is uncommon in political science, but doing so 
allows analysts to consider the role of cognitive biases alongside standard predictors of 
political participation.  
Risk attitudes are a spectrum ranging from risk aversion to risk acceptance. 
Prospect theory finds that risk aversion is predominant, tracing back to early development 
as humans learned to weigh losses larger than gains for the sake of survival, thereby 
hardwiring risk aversion into human cognition (Kahneman, 282). What leads people to 
abandon risk avoidance and accept risks? A person undertakes risk as she faces and 
accepts uncertainty, leading to stress because of the possibility that some unfortunate 
consequence might occur. In exchange, she is seeking pay offs that might not be gained 
through risk aversion, or playing-it-safe, while not being entirely aware of the 
probabilities of success (Hansson and Zalta 2014). 
As reviewed in a prior chapter, risk attitudes may serve as a lens that filters 
external cues. One test considered that the framing settings proposed by prospect theory 
applies to public policies, presenting them in terms emphasizing gains or losses 
concurrently. Kam and Simas (2010) found consistency in choices by risk attitudes, as 
the risk averse sought frames promoting certainty, while the risk accepting opted for 
probabilistic outcomes. The implication being that policy framing finds receptive 
audiences based on levels of risk in the public, which might be manipulated to generate 
support. Risk attitudes also shifted positions on issues like free trade and immigration 
depending on low or high wage employment. Specifically, opposition was high if wages 
were low and risk aversion was common, while supports were likely to be high wage 
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earner with risk acceptance (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010). In another study, when 
respondents were primed about the uncertain nature of government policies, military 
intervention in Darfur saw less support from the risk averse, more support from the risk 
accepting, and fewer Don’t Know responses (Eckles and Schaffner 2011). The 
differences in opinion according to risk aversion and risk acceptance in public also 
explained political behavior. Risk accepting respondents are observed to have been 
involved in non-electoral politics more than risk averse peers (Kam 2012). While with 
voting, the risk averse desiring certainty favored congressional incumbents who promised 
steady gains, rather than challengers to incumbents who garnered support from voters 
reporting risk acceptance (Eckles et al. 2014). And yet, previous scholarship has not 
established a link between risk attitudes and voting itself.   
This chapter reconsiders that risk attitudes explain voting because filtering of 
external cues is compatible with voter characteristics. Citizens with higher incomes have 
the time and ability to vote, which might predispose them to high risk, while older 
citizens, who are also more likely to vote, tend to be risk avoiders. Voters possessing 
psychological engagement to vote will be invested in the outcome of elections, 
potentially favoring certainty over unknown conditions presented by risk aversion. In 
addition, the communication that voters receive for recruitment and mobilization would 
promote gains to be made by voting, perhaps appealing to risk aversion in the public. So 
risk aversion might be more associated with voting than risk acceptance. Chapter 3 
demonstrates that risk accepting minorities highly value non-electoral participation, and 
if, according my hypothesis, the risk accepting vote less than the risk averse, then non-
whites could be voting less than Whites due to similar levels of risk acceptance. Black 
and Latinos gaps with Whites could also close under risk aversion. Risk aversion, the 
desire to steadiness and certainty could be empowering to Blacks and Latinos given 
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uncertainty surrounding other voter characteristics like outreach, resources, and external 
cues. 
Outreach by campaigns is an example of interventions seeking to appeal to voters 
on the basis of a shared sense of political affiliation or, in the case of minority voters, 
ethnic community. Mobilization serves as a reminder of upcoming elections and an 
invitation to participate in voting, but its effects are not equal for all subsets of the public. 
Political campaigns selectively mobilize likely supporters, and minority groups report 
being contacted at lower rates than do White voters (Bowler and Segura 2012, p. 127). A 
consequence is that new Americans and other potential first-time voters of Latino and 
Asian backgrounds fall off of mobilization radars, and out of the political party system by 
extension, likely due to geographical concentrations outside battleground states (Lee and 
Zoltan 2011). Attempts at harnessing new technology to cut down costs occurred in 2008 
with non-English campaign websites, but this passively assumed new Americans will 
flock to the candidates and parties once information is available (Bowler and Segura 
2012). Get-Out-The-Vote efforts deploying personal outreach welcoming newcomers to 
the electorate are most successful (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012) and enabled by 
residence in ethnic enclaves (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016), but wide scale adoption is 
lacking. So mobilization can be a powerful force for Latino voting but only when it is 
launched in a deliberate manner geared to Latinos. 
Similar differences are common for minorities when it comes to resources 
associated with voting, regardless of whether campaign contact is absent or low-quality. 
Education, income, social class, and age (or life stage) are resources voters may draw on, 
providing time, know-how, and prior experience that enhance the likelihood of voting. 
Compared to Whites – the majority racial group – Blacks, Latinos, and Asians are 
younger in age, have achieved less education, and attain lower family income, and so are 
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less likely to vote (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Multivariate models explaining voting as 
a function of race and ethnicity and other resource variables indicate that non-white 
differences disappear when resources disadvantages are reduced. (Bowler and Segura 
2012). Improving such resources is difficult to do but support networks like religious 
organizations help reduce barriers that forge civic associations (Jones-Correa and Leal 
2001). 
Psychological engagement addresses issues with motivation to pay attention or 
participate in political affairs commonly affecting minorities. A usual first step is the 
collection of political information that individuals learn to judge as consistent or 
inconsistent with their world views (Zaller 1992). This process yields political 
sophistication driven by belief systems that provide consistency in opinions, enabling 
accurate translation of preferences to issue positions for elected leaders to represent 
(Converse 1964; Luskin 1987). One measure of sophistication is political knowledge, and 
it is the case that racial/ethnic minorities know many fewer facts, report being much less 
interested, and are less likely to seek information compared to Whites (Pantoja 2005). 
Such disadvantages are persistent despite increased levels of educational attainment in 
recent decades (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). We know also that political 
“sophistication depends, above all, on motivation” (Luskin 1990, p. 351) but this can be 
short-lived for groups like Latinos. In the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries, 
Latinos in battleground states responded when relevant issues were at stake and outreach 
by co-ethnic official and candidates was common (Barreto et al. 2008), but a surge of 
Latino voters was not seen in the general election (Corral et al. forthcoming). 
The literature on increasing psychological engagement for minorities recasts 
issues with motivation to show that it might be increased by racial/ethnic terms. One 
branch is ethnic threat, as Latino naturalizations, Democratic voting, and political 
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sophistication increased in response to anti-immigration in 1990’s California (Pantoja and 
Segura 2003; Bowler et al. 2005). Another branch is ethnic supportiveness, as Latinos 
know more about Latino politicians and have more political knowledge in dense ethnic 
communities (Pantoja 2005; DeSante and Perry 2015). A third branch is that of co-ethnic 
candidates pushing Latinos to turnout in support of their own. This may have occurred 
for Latinos in the 2008 primaries, but the general election saw mixed results (Barreto et 
al. 2008; Corral et al. forthcoming). The condition was fulfilled when Black voters turned 
out at higher levels for President Obama in 2008 and 2012. However, reliance on co-
ethnic candidates is problematic because party elites heavily influence candidate selection 
and co-ethnic appeals may backfire as White voters become alienated by ethnic cues 
(Casellas 2010; McConnaughy et al. 2010).  
These three branches are context specific with limited application. What is needed 
is a more fundamental factor in the psychological engagement with politics that reduces 
the emphasis on race-ethnicity while simultaneously better understanding what shapes 
minority-majority gaps in voting. 
Shortcomings in information acquisition and external motivating factors paint a 
bleak picture for evaluation and promoting minority participation. Minorities do not 
know “enough” about politics, and involvement despite low knowledge can be 
misguided. A focus on ethnic-specific factors, like the presence of co-ethnic candidates, 
is problematic because Latinos do not control such nominations and the effects on turnout 
are short-lived at best. This chapter makes a case for risk attitudes as an indicator of 
psychological engagement to election campaigns in particular and politics in general. 
This economic concept benefits from not involving the above factors, such as knowledge, 
which can be normative, or ethnic appeal, which can be exclusionary of non-co-ethnic 
groups. 
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My evaluation of the effect of risk attitudes on voting is informed by Prospect 
Theory. It posits that risk aversion is common while risk acceptance is less common, 
occurring in response to motivating conditions. The modal strategy seems to be caution 
(risk aversion) when dealing with favorable prospects, but people transition to risk 
acceptance when confronted with threats to their livelihood. Taking risks in the face of 
danger makes sense, but the logic for risk aversion seems non-rational if we are to 
assume utility maximization. Observers might find it odd, for example, that people slow 
down to plan carefully as things start to go well. This logic forms the basis of my 
theoretical expectations that risk aversion is associated with voting, which is often non-
rational due to high costs of participation. Voting also provides an outlet for political 
expression providing certainty to the risk averse. 
Officials rely on voting to derive consent from the citizenry to govern as parties 
advance platforms and positions that voters identify as compatible. In other words, voting 
is the quintessential institution of representative democracy. Voting is a ritual that takes 
place on Tuesdays and sits atop a drawn out process of candidate selection and mass 
campaigns. The primary election process serves to winnow out candidates for office to 
ensure that each political party is represented by one candidate in the general election. 
Campaigning includes voter mobilization by interested parties, and the horse-race 
coverage of the media pits candidates against one another. By the time election day 
arrives, the electorate is well acquainted with the top candidates. Candidates will have 
been narrowed down, platforms will have been presented, and most voters know who 
they will vote for by the summer of a presidential election year. In a de facto two-party 
system such as the U.S., voters can be certain that one of two major party candidates will 
assume office after an election, providing high certainty about the continuity of 
governance and lawmaking. In short, voting is an institution with normative expectations 
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and behavior that is governed by election laws familiarizing citizens with participatory 
republican democracy. Voting is unlike the involvement in informal politics, the focus of 
chapter 3, which are costly and uncertain in success but popular among the risk 
accepting. 
Minority and majority voters alike are susceptible to cognitive biases described in 
prospect theory due to the nature of human evolution that transcends racial and ethnic 
identities. And yet we might expect to see that the effect of risk attitudes on voting for 
Blacks and Latinos compared to Whites. Owing to life conditions, individuals from 
different groups might adopt different strategies that are independent of conventional 
measures like resources or political factors. What is left is a distillation of the minority 
experience in approaches to uncertainty vis-à-vis White Americans. 
 
Risk Aversion Voting Hypothesis: The likelihood of voting is higher for the risk-averse 
than for the risk-accepting. 
 
Racial, Ethnic Gaps Hypothesis: The likelihood of voting for Blacks and Latinos is 
higher than for Whites at higher levels of risk aversion, while higher levels of risk 
acceptance should lead to relatively low minority turnout. 
MEASURES 
This chapter analyzes data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES) to determine whether risk attitudes are negatively associated with voting and 
whether the association is different for Latinos and Whites. The CCES validates whether 
respondents voted or not based on county voter files. The first part is a panel of 9,500 
respondents for the 2010, 2012, and 2014 general elections. The second part is a 2016 
module sponsored by the University of Texas at Austin containing a new draw of 1,000 
respondents. The first is publicly available and contains a measure of risk attitudes known 
as the Risk Tolerance Scale (RTS), which I added to the 2016 module to recreate the 
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initial findings and test if they extended into 2016. The 2016 module also contains 
customized questions about the importance of particular factors for the decision to vote 
that I correlate with risk attitudes by respondent race/ethnicity. 
The first independent variables in this analysis are the categorical identifier for 
respondent race and ethnicity - White, Black, Latino, and other non-Whites including 
Asians. The four categories sort respondents in the 2010-14 surveys and the 2016 survey 
with the following representations in each dataset: White (72.55%, 71.60%), Black 
(11.73%, 10.84%), Latino (10.36%, 10.23%) and Other (5.36%, 6.63%). The US Census 
Bureau provides estimates for White alone, Not Hispanic or Latino (69.10%), Black or 
African American alone (12.70%), and Hispanic or Latino (11.70%) in 2015. Shares of 
non-whites in these data are small but closely aligned with the American Community 
Survey’s estimates of the voting age population. In the models, White respondents are the 
reference category, comparing effect sizes of the RTS (see below) covariate between 
Whites and Black and Whites and Latinos to determine whether the decisions to vote by 
minority groups were disproportionately influenced by risk attitudes. 
Another independent variable of interest is the Risk Tolerance Scale (RTS), 
measuring one’s propensity to tolerate uncertainty in the domain of personal finances 
(Barsky et al. 1997). The measure’s focus is particularly fitting to a voting model given 
consistent links between individual economic circumstances and political behavior like 
preferences or participation (Campbell et al. 1980; Lewis-Beck 1985). Working and 
middle classes voters facing economic pressures are particularly prone to pocketbook 
voting due to economic pressures and the perception of politics as a remedy (Lewis-Beck 
et al. 2008). 
The RTS is composed of four categories where respondents report a willingness 
to risk 0%, 20%, 33%, or 50% of current income for a new job that might offer double 
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income. The survey instrument adjusts the size of the potential income gains with every 
level of risk accepted. The initial branching question asks: 
“Suppose you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a 
good job guaranteed to give you income every year for life. You are 
given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 
chance it will double your income and a 50-50 chance it will cut it your 
income by a third. Would you take the new job?”  
Respondents are offered the options “Yes” or “No.” If No, the survey asks:  
“Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your income, 
and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20 percent.”  
This second question is for respondents that turned down the initial offer, sorting them to 
a lower level of risk that might be more tolerable. Saying “No” to this follow-up provides 
the observation of “Least Risk Tolerant” with 0% risk accepted and is coded as 0. 
Turning down the initial offer (saying “No”) but accepting this second one indicates a 
willingness to lose 20% of income for the opportunity to double earnings (code value: 2). 
The procedure then sorts respondents that accepted the initial offer of risking “a 
third” of their income into an additional question that increases the hazard threshold. It 
asks:  
“Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your income, 
and a 50-50 chance that it would cut it in half. Would you still take the 
new job?”  
Turning down this second offer after accepting the initial one (saying “Yes” then 
“No”) indicates that respondents are tolerant of the risk of losing 33.3% of income but 
not 50% (code value: 3). Lastly, accepting both offers (saying “Yes” then saying “Yes”) 
means the respondent is “Most Risk Tolerant” (willing to risk 50% of current earnings) 
and therefore coded 4. The potential benefit for these risk takers is a lurch forward toward 
a new status despite the potential losses. Risk- accepting individuals depart from the 
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modal tendency toward risk aversion in the population due to dissatisfaction with their 
current circumstances. This desire to get ahead is at odds with desiring certainty or 
predictability to protect existing gains. I hypothesize that this tendency toward risk 
aversion is predictive of voting. 
The dependent variables for the analyses are measures of voting that report 
whether respondents voted or not in two forms. A first method of assessment is Self-
Reporting whereby respondents are asked whether they voted, although the reliability of 
such answers is a longstanding problem for political science. The social desirability effect 
means that respondents offer “yes” responses to appear engaged, which seems to follow 
election cycle partisan bandwagons (Katosh and Traugott 1981). Other correlates of over-
reporting include high education, perceptions of voting as salient, support for the 
institution of voting (Silver et al. 1986), and a survey’s focus on politics and voting 
(Brenner and DeLamater 2016). Over-reporters may have intended to vote but were 
unable to do so and are unwilling to admit their failure to interviewers. Social desirability 
is limited with mail and online surveys {citation?}. Nevertheless, self-reports offer the 
possibility of false positives that can limit inference by skewing the distribution of voters 
toward the right and limiting the explanatory power of characteristics of true voters. 
The use of vote validation records provided by county registrars can correct for 
over-reporting, but composing these data is time consuming and expensive so they are 
uncommon. Wherever available, vote validation brings to light that inferences about 
voting can be biased due to respondents struggling with answering self-reports, but 
missing validation records can be non-random (Abelson et al. 1991). Instances of voters 
appearing twice, having the same names, changed surnames after marriage, and the entire 
state of Virginia withholding voter records are examples. Relying on voter validated data 
can therefore limit models because actual voters are dropped due to the inability to locate 
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their records. Characteristics of these missing voters such as race, gender, and attitudes 
and trust toward government will also be missing, potentially yielding inconsistent effects 
across models (Timpone 1998). 
Table 20: Self-Reported Voting by Race/Ethnicity in the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study, Percent and Observations 
Election 
Cycle 










2010 mean .75 .77 .66 .74 -.11* - 
Midterm obs. 9314.7 6850.1 1085.0 914.4   
2012 mean .84 .84 .85 .83 - - 
Presidential obs. 9296.2 6855.4 1059.2 886.9   
2014 mean .76 .77 .78 .66 - -.11* 
Midterm obs. 9307.5 6823.3 1102.2 878.0   
2016 mean .75 .77 .69 .67 - - 
Presidential obs. 858.2 646.1 76.4 86.7   
Source: 2010-14 CCES Panel; 2016 CCES, UT Austin Module. Coding: Did not vote: 0, 
Voted: 1. Noncitizens dropped from tabulations. Weighted frequencies presented. + p < .10, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 21: Validated Voting by Race/Ethnicity in the Cooperative Congressional Election 
Study, Percent and Observations 
Election 
Cycle 










2010 mean .68 .69 .59 .69 -.10* - 
Midterm obs. 8192.3 6197.3 881.4 715.7   
2012 mean .80 .81 .77 .72 - - 
Presidential obs. 7292.2 5666.0 664.8 569.7   
2014 mean .73 .75 .71 .59 - -.15** 
Midterm obs. 7639.4 5713.5 850.7 708.9   
2016 mean .73 .77 .62 .59 - - 
Presidential obs. 661.1 506.1 74.0 48.2   
Source: 2010-14 CCES Panel; 2016 CCES, UT Austin Module. Coding: Did not vote: 0, 
Voted: 1. Noncitizens dropped from tabulations. Weighted frequencies presented. + p < .10, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Data from the CCES offer both self-reported and voter validated voting, as shown 
in Tables 20 and 21. Frequencies presented are weighted and disaggregated by race and 
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ethnicity, with differences of means tests between Black and White respondents and 
between Latino and White respondents to determine significant differences in 
propensities to vote. It is clear from the tables that self-reported voting is higher than 
validated records. A benefit of self-reports is that the variables have more observations 
than validated voting, which might be ideal for investigations of characteristics of voters 
or would-be voters. The purposes of this chapter are to uncover reasons for voting and 
non-voting so more accurate representation by validated records is ideal. Further, 
tabulations or voter validations reflect similar differences in means with self-reports. 
Specifically, both record that Blacks voted at lower rates than Whites in 2010 and that 
Latinos voted at lower rates than Whites in 2014. Voting in all other contests show no 
statistically significant differences. 
FINDINGS 
Mechanisms Underlying Risk Attitudes and Voting 
Prior to testing whether the RTS can help explain voter turnout, I consider 
whether the risk attitudes measure is linked to factors that the public might consider when 
taking part in voting. With the 2016 CCES, I tested whether risk attitudes could be 
explained by the vote factors (a) Candidate Likability, (b) Costs and Hassles of Voting, 
(c) Closeness of Elections, and (D) Money Raised and Spent by Candidate Campaigns, 
along with the covariates age, education, income, gender, party identification, political 
ideology, and interest in politics. Ordered logistic regression coefficients for models of 
White, Black, and Latino respondents are presented in Graph 10 with 95% confidence 
intervals. The goal is to establish a basic understanding of how propensities toward risk 
aversion and acceptance relate to approaching the electoral arena, and how those 
relationships might differ by race/ethnicity.  
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In the tests for White, Black, and Latino respondents, I find that the Latino RTS 
was shaped by two turnout factors, the White RTS to one, and the Black RTS to none. 
The statistically significant effects indicate that the RTS is closely aligned to the act of 
voting but that risk attitudes might be more politically relevant for Latinos than for any 
other group. 
 
Graph 10: The Risk Tolerance Scale and Voter Turnout Factors for Whites, Blacks, and 
Latinos 
Latinos share in common with Whites positive correlations indicating that the 
more risk accepting respondents were, the more they considered particular factors to be 
important. Increased risk is associated with Latinos reporting that election closeness, and 
Whites stating that money raised and spent by the candidates, are important factors 





-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
White Black Latino
Ordered logit coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Source: 2016 CCES UT Austin Module
Risk Tolerance and Voter Turnout Factors
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the factors as important considerations or preconditions to voting, whereas risk-averse 
peers were less concerned about these preconditions. So this evidence indicates that risk 
accepting Whites and Latinos will have considered election closeness and money raised 
and spent as preconditions for their participation. Their risk accepting peers did not 
consider the factors as important to casting ballots and might have done so more than the 
risk accepting. 
Latinos are different from Whites and Blacks in that turnout factors showed a 
negative correlation with risk attitudes. Modeling Latino RTS shows that respondents 
indicating that candidate likability was an important factor in voting were also risk 
averse, not risk accepting. It is evident that risk-averse Latinos needed to feel that they 
like or trust a candidate prior to voting. Risk-accepting Latinos have a comparably lower 
regard for this consideration.  
The mechanisms underlying the relationship between voting and risk attitudes 
describes that Latinos have preconditions to vote if either risk averse or risk accepting. 
Whites have a similar contextual reason but only for risk acceptance. Both risk averse 
and risk accepting? Latinos care about liking the candidates and their risk accepting peers 
care about the closeness of the election. It is not clear whether the factors relevant to 
Latino risk attitudes could mean that risk attitudes are associated with low or high voting. 
For now, the results give the appearance that Latinos on either end of the risk attitude 
spectrum are deliberate about reasons for voting, though it is not clear what factor has the 
biggest bearing on risk attitudes. 
Risks Attitudes and Self-Reported Voting 
The first cut in explaining voting as a function of risk attitudes is the use of self-
reported voting as a dependent variable. As discussed above, some respondents misreport 
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that they have voted, so self-reports do not offer true measures of voting behavior. 
Nevertheless, the use of self-reports is ubiquitous because voter validation is uncommon 
in social surveys. My intention here is to recreate Kam’s (2012) original tests and expect 
to find that the RTS is not associated with voting. The lack of statistically significant 
effects for the RTS in the self-reported model but its significance in a validated vote 
model would mean that better data on voting reveals what was previously unseen. 
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Table 22: Predictors of Self-Reported Voting; 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 General Elections, Logistic Regression Estimates 
 2010 2012 2014 2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
RTS .04 (.07) .04 (.08) .05 (.08) .04 (.09) -.02 (.06) -.01 (.07) .03 (.13) .11 (.17) 
Black -.09 (.26) .05 (.46) .59+ (.34) .62 (.63) .89** (.29) 1.09* (.48) -.14 (.55) .49 (.86) 
Latino .64* (.29) .99+ (.56) .48 (.36) .21 (.63) -.17 (.30) .11 (.56) .16 (.52) .60 (.88) 
Other .01 (.35) -1.08+ (.61) .35 (.45) .51 (.81) .01 (.32) -.57 (.58) -.93+ (.49) -.41 (.99) 
Age .02*** (.01) .02*** (.01) .39 (.42) .39 (.42) .02*** (.01) .02*** (.01) .04*** (.01) .04*** (.01) 
Income .10*** (.02) .10*** (.02) 1.31** (.47) 1.32** (.47) .05 (.03) .05+ (.03) .16** (.05) .16** (.05) 
Education .42*** (.10) .42*** (.10) 1.19*** (.33) 1.20*** (.33) .36*** (.09) .36*** (.09) .86*** (.17) .85*** (.17) 
Female -.54*** (.15) -.57*** (.15) -.33+ (.19) -.32+ (.20) -.63*** (.16) -.63*** (.16) .05 (.30) .05 (.31) 
Party ID -.00 (.05) -.01 (.05) -.19 (.33) -.19 (.33) .10* (.05) .10+ (.05) .01 (.10) .01 (.10) 
Ideology .13 (.10) .14 (.10) .28 (.45) .31 (.46) -.17 (.11) -.16 (.11) .03 (.18) .03 (.18) 
Political Interest 1.45*** (.10) 1.44*** (.10) 2.75*** (.23) 2.76*** (.23) 1.18*** (.10) 1.18*** (.10) .74*** (.18) .75*** (.18) 
Black # RTS   -.07 (.19)   -.01 (.26)   -.10 (.21)   -.30 (.33) 
Latino # RTS   -.17 (.23)   .15 (.28)   -.15 (.23)   -.25 (.40) 
Other # RTS   .57+ (.30)   -.08 (.33)   .31 (.31)   -.27 (.40) 
Constant -4.77*** (.49) -4.76*** (.49) -.96* (.38) -.96* (.39) -3.05*** (.52) -3.09*** (.52) -4.95*** (.78) -5.11*** (.80) 
F-Statistic 33.30*** 27.23*** 21.62*** 17.11*** 24.92*** 20.27*** 8.86*** 7.74*** 
Observations 9496 9496 9498 9498 9498 9498 878 878 
Logistics regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: CCES 2014 (Common Content); 2016 (University of Texas at Austin Module). + p < .10, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 22 contains models of Self-Reported voting as dependent variables with 
logistic regression coefficients. The respondents are from the CCES surveys in 2010, 
2012, and 2014 as well as the separate 2016 module. For each election cycle, the CCES 
asked respondents whether they had voted, and the responses are coded as (0) No and (1) 
Yes. The entries in Table 22 are organized per election cycle, each of which is comprised 
of two columns; Model 1 contains coefficients for standard logistic regression models 
with variables that are not transformed, with the RTS variable alongside covariates, 
including race and ethnicity. Model 2 uses the same explanatory measures but with 
interactions between the RTS and respondent race and ethnicity. Coefficients for the RTS 
by Black, Latino, and Other non-White are indications of whether the effect of their RTS 
on the dependent variable differs from its effect among Whites. 
Across the board for the two midterm and two presidential elections, the standard 
predictors explain self-reported voting in expected ways but the RTS does not. The RTS 
is coded with risk-accepting values at the top and risk-averse values at the bottom, and 
significant differences in risk propensities do not appear to have influenced turnout.  I 
show that the lack of evidence for a link between the RTS and self-reported voting is 
consistent across election cycles. Further, models with interaction terms also confirm that 
the Black and Latino RTS provide no additional influence on the dependent variable 
compared to Whites, so the RTS is also ineffective among racial and ethnic groups across 
elections. For data with self-reported turnout, risk propensities do not predict voting. In 
the next section, I test whether this pattern persists in data that includes validated turnout 
information. 
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Risk Attitudes and Validated Voting 
A problem with self-reported voting as a dependent variable is that over-reporting 
causes the measure to lose some of its variance, whereas more accurate voter validation 
measures will have greater shares of respondents that are non-voters. Tables 20 and 21 
show, for example, that in 2010 75% said they voted, but validation records located 
indicate that 68% did.  And in every case, it is apparent that minority voters overstated 
having voted more so than did Whites. In all cases except 2010 (and a Latino-Black tie in 
2014), it is notable that Latinos were the most likely to over-report. In 2012, for example, 
voting is adjusted downward 2% for Whites and 7% for Blacks, while 11% for Latinos. 
Voter validation records provide more opportunities for non-voters to exhibit risk 
attitudes, but also a better opportunity for evaluating whether the risk attitudes of Latino 
non-voters might be different from those of White and Latino voters. 
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Table 23: Predictors of Validated Voting; 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 General Elections, Logistic Regression Estimates 
 2010 2012 2014 2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
RTS -.01 (.05) .02 (.05) -.03 (.06) .00 (.07) .00 (.06) .02 (.07) -.15 (.12) -.33* (.14) 
Black -.12 (.23) .01 (.43) .27 (.28) .44 (.53) .27 (.25) .18 (.44) -.35 (.47) -1.55* (.78) 
Latino .40 (.27) 1.23* (.58) -.27 (.26) -.05 (.54) -.42 (.28) .56 (.54) -.56 (.45) -1.80* (.87) 
Other .26 (.27) -.45 (.47) .63 (.44) 1.20+ (.64) -.33 (.27) -1.08* (.49) -1.52+ (.87) -5.07* (1.99) 
Age .02*** (.00) .02*** (.00) -.10 (.37) -.08 (.37) .02*** (.01) .02*** (.01) .02+ (.01) .02* (.01) 
Income .06** (.02) .06** (.02) .90* (.36) .89* (.36) .04+ (.02) .05+ (.02) .16** (.05) .17** (.05) 
Education .18** (.07) .17** (.06) .61* (.26) .61* (.26) .24** (.08) .24** (.08) .54** (.18) .54** (.17) 
Female -.38** (.12) -.40*** (.12) -.33* (.15) -.33* (.15) -.52*** (.15) -.52*** (.14) -.22 (.29) -.26 (.28) 
Party ID .06 (.04) .05 (.04) .93** (.30) .92** (.30) .09+ (.05) .08+ (.05) -.10 (.08) -.10 (.08) 
Ideology -.05 (.09) -.05 (.08) -.60 (.40) -.59 (.41) -.19+ (.10) -.19+ (.10) .12 (.16) .11 (.16) 
Political Interest .95*** (.09) .95*** (.09) 1.98*** (.21) 1.99*** (.21) .82*** (.10) .83*** (.10) .32+ (.18) .35+ (.18) 
Black # RTS   -.07 (.17)   -.09 (.23)   .04 (.19)   .55+ (.29) 
Latino # RTS   -.42* (.20)   -.12 (.23)   -.52* (.21)   .78 (.51) 
Other # RTS   .35 (.22)   -.30 (.29)   .40 (.29)   2.37* (1.14) 
Constant -2.92*** (.37) -2.95*** (.37) -.30 (.33) -.38 (.34) -2.14*** (.47) -2.21*** (.47) -1.85* (.79) -1.67* (.83) 
F-Statistic 23.23*** 19.12*** 19.17*** 15.26*** 15.99*** 15.01*** 4.52*** 3.72*** 
Observations 8789 8789 8027 8027 8180 8180 714 714 
Logistics regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: CCES 2014 (Common Content); 2016 (University of Texas at Austin Module). + p < .10, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 23 models the dependent variable of validated voting using the 2010, 2012, 
and 2014 CCES surveys as well as the 2016 UT Austin module. The models again show 
logistic regression estimates explaining what types of respondents (0) did not vote or (1) 
voted. Each election cycle grouping contains two columns, one for models with the 
standard specification and another for models with interactions between the RTS and 
race/ethnicity. Results contained in Table 23 for the standard models yield that the RTS is 
not a statistically significant predictor of voting in any of the elections. Model 2 columns 
for the midterm elections of 2010 and 2014 tell a different story. 
 
Table 24: Predicted Probabilities, Marginal Effects of Voting Models 
Cycle  RTS=1 RTS=2 RTS=3 RTS=4 Avg. 
2010 White .68 .68 .69 .69 .00 
 Latino .80 .74 .68 .60 -.06* 
 Diff. .13* - - - -.06* 
2012 White .80 .80 .80 .80 - 
 Latino .78 .76 .74 .72 - 
 Diff. - - - - - 
2014 White .73 .74 .74 .75 .00 
 Latino .74 .65 .56 .45 -.09** 
 Diff. - -.09+ -.19** -.29** -.09* 
2016 White .81 .76 .70 .64 -.05* 
 Latino .64 .72 .79 .84 - 
 Diff. - - - - - 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Variable interactions for Latinos and RTS shown in Table 23 provide evidence 
that the influence of risk attitudes on the dependent variable is significantly different 
from Whites. The effect is in the negative direction, indicating a negative difference in 
slopes of effects between Whites and Latinos as the RTS increases in value. In other 
words, vote propensities diverged from a period of initial convergence as members of the 
two groups approach risk acceptance.  
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In Table 24, I provide predicted probabilities of respondents having voted per 
validated records for every level of the RTS. The marginal effects estimates first 
demonstrate the significance of the RTS among Whites and Latinos by reporting average 
changes in probability of voting. Among Latinos a one-unit increase in the RTS is 
associated with average declines of 6 and 9 percentage points in 2010 and 2014 turnout. 
Though seemingly small, the negative effect of risk acceptance on Latino voting is quite 
high - of the Latinos interviewed, 80% that were risk averse voted in 2010 compared to 
60% of those that reported risk acceptance. In 2014, 74% of the risk averse voted 
compared to 45% of those who reported risk acceptance. Whites are also set back by risk 
acceptance, yielding a negative correlation averaging a 5% decline in 2016; 81% of risk 
averse Whites voted compared to just 64% of risk accepting Whites. 
Predicted probabilities of Table 24 also expand statistically significant differences 
between White and Latino RTS effects on the dependent variable. The Model 2 columns 
for 2010 and 2012 in Table 23 show that the effect of the RTS on validated voting among 
Latinos is significantly different than it is for Whites, and in a negative direction. The 
predicted probabilities show that in 2010, 80% of risk-averse Latinos voted compared to 
68% of risk-averse Whites, and the difference is statistically significant. The slope of the 
effect of the RTS for Latinos declines as risk increases but it is flat for Whites, indicating 
no effect, thus the negative interaction coefficient.  
The same negative difference between Whites and Latinos appears in 2014, but 
instead of Latinos voting more than Whites when both are risk averse, I observe that 
Latinos voted much less often than Whites with every increasing level of the RTS. At the 
lowest level, 74% of Latinos voted and 73% of Whites voted, so no difference is 
detected. At the highest RTS level, 75% of Whites voted but the rate of Latino voting 




Graph 11: The Risk Tolerance Scale and Validated Voting in 2010 and 2014 Midterm 
Elections for Whites and Latinos 
Illustrations of White and Latino differences in predicted probabilities according 
to the RTS are contained in Graph 11. The illustrations show that the RTS was 
consistently negative in its effect on Latino voting, indicating that voting by the risk 
averse was high but considerably lower for the risk accepting. These results indicate that 
risk acceptance is a reason for diminished Latino voter turnout in the midterm elections. 
In both the 2010 and 2014 cycles, voter turnout was a typical rate of close to 50% but for 
Latinos it was close to 30% in 2010 and just above 20 percent in 2014 (US Elections 
Project 2019). The CCES reports much higher voting rates because it over samples voters 












































The results in this section identify that the effect of risk attitudes on voting 
propensities is limited to midterm elections. In the 2010 and 2014 congressional contests, 
risk averse Latinos showed up to the polls while risk accepting peers stayed home. Why 
is the result not evident in the presidential contests of 2012 and 2016 for Latinos? The 
RTS is negatively correlated with voting for Whites in 2016 but not in other midterm 
elections. So Whites and Latinos appear to respond to the types of elections differently.  
One answer to this puzzle could be voter mobilization, as the mass-scale and 
national mobilizations of presidential campaigns are missing in midterm years. 2010 and 
2014 election outcomes saw Democrats lose control of its congressional majorities and 
efforts were focused on mobilizing its base that included of non-white voters like Latinos. 
Democratic outreach to minority voters was very effective among risk averse Latinos but 
not risk accepting Latinos. In presidential elections, Latinos will have received less focus 
but from nationwide campaigns, explaining the lack of differences in turnout between 
risk averse and risk accepting Latinos, while Whites were particularly emboldened by 
messages appealing to their risk attitudes in 2016. The following section considers 
whether the association between risk and voting is dependent on campaign contact. 
Risk Attitudes and Validated Voting Conditional on Campaign Contact 
Political campaigns appeal to voters through methods like phone calls, mail, 
email, text messages, or in-person canvassing to help mobilize likely supporters to cast 
ballots. The context of the messages might contain dates, times, and places for voter 
registration and polling places, as well as statements promoting candidate credentials or 
other reasons for voting, like partisan and ethnic appeal. Depending on its form, outreach 
may be cheap but certainly not free so senders will target receivers that are likely to vote 
on Election Day. The relationship between the RTS and voting may rely on campaign 
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contact because invitations to vote are especially influential among the risk averse. 
Information provided by campaign and non-partisan organizations alike extol the benefits 
of voting such as protecting interests and exercising civic duty.  
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Table 25: Predictors of Validated Voting by Campaign Contact, Race/Ethnicity & Risk Tolerance Scale Interactions; 2010, 
2012, 2014, 2016 General Elections, Logistic Regression Estimates 
 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Contacted No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
RTS -.04 (.08) .05 (.07) -.01 (.12) .02 (.09) -.06 (.10) .10 (.09) -.23 (.21) -.55* (.23) 
Black .57 (.71) -.42 (.52) -.02 (.78) .85 (.80) .26 (.73) -.29 (.54) -1.06 (1.15) -2.83* (1.36) 
Latino 1.19 (.79) 2.12*** (.64) -.02 (.81) .26 (.62) .20 (.74) 1.98** (.68) -1.22 (1.08) 1.17 (1.00) 
Other .06 (.76) -.69 (.63) 2.44* (.99) .22 (.85) -1.70** (.59) -.76 (.66) -1.93 (2.59) -7.2** (2.59) 
Black # RTS -.36 (.27) .05 (.21) .06 (.32) -.25 (.33) -.03 (.31) .19 (.23) .16 (.42) 1.07+ (.63) 
Latino # RTS -.48 (.29) -.63* (.27) .16 (.35) -.41+ (.25) -.37 (.32) -.94*** (.23) .57 (.58) -.39 (.35) 
Other # RTS .01 (.28) .55* (.28) -.97+ (.50) .15 (.29) .65* (.26) .15 (.34) 1.09 (1.09) 3.19 (1.94) 
Age .00 (.01) .02*** (.01) -.95 (.64) -.50 (.49) .02* (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Income .01 (.03) .07** (.03) -.28 (.55) 1.29** (.46) -.00 (.04) .06* (.03) .18* (.08) .05 (.08) 
Education .20 (.12) .10 (.07) .82* (.41) .21 (.30) .33** (.12) .06 (.10) .60** (.23) .40 (.30) 
Female -.81*** (.19) -.13 (.15) -.53* (.26) -.15 (.18) -.64** (.21) -.44* (.19) -.51 (.44) -1.15** (.45) 
Party ID .09 (.06) .02 (.05) 1.12* (.46) 1.00** (.37) .14* (.07) -.01 (.06) -.03 (.14) -.19 (.14) 
Ideology -.04 (.13) -.05 (.11) -.48 (.57) -.99+ (.57) -.17 (.15) -.12 (.14) .19 (.24) .11 (.30) 
interest .92*** (.14) .74*** (.12) 1.66*** (.31) 1.72*** (.30) .74*** (.14) .63*** (.15) .17 (.25) -.13 (.30) 
Constant -2.24*** (.59) -2.31*** (.50) -.21 (.53) .49 (.43) -2.56*** (.72) -.28 (.66) -1.36 (1.20) 3.36* (1.58) 
F-Statistic 7.38*** 8.48*** 4.68*** 7.19*** 5.63*** 5.35*** 1.97* 2.10** 
Observations 2262 6482 1500 6484 2123 6016 265 343 
Logistics regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: CCES 2014 (Common Content); 2016 (University of Texas at Austin Module). + p < 
.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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The expectation is tested in the multivariate validated voting models of Table 25. 
Using 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 data, they feature interactions between the RTS and 
respondent race and ethnicity. The columns for each election year are estimates for two 
sets of respondents with validated votes, those that were not contacted by campaigns and 
those that were contacted. The results show that campaign contact is indeed a 
determining factor in the relationship between risk attitudes and voting for Latinos. 
Specifically, contacted Latinos differed in voting along the RTS compared to Whites for 
the 2010, 2012, and 2014 elections. The coefficients are in the negative direction, 
indicating that Latino voting dramatically declined as the RTS increase in value, that is, 
as respondents reported being more risk accepting. The results are similar to those 
without campaign contact but here it is uncovered that White-Latino differences in the 
effect of the RTS on validated voting is localized to those experiencing mobilization.  
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Table 26: Predicted Probabilities by Campaign Contact, Marginal Effects of Voting 
Models 
Cycle Contact  RTS=1 RTS=2 RTS=3 RTS=4 Avg. 
2010 No White .59 .58 .57 .56 - 
  Latino .72 .62 .52 .41 -.10* 
  Diff. - - - - - 
 Yes White .73 .74 .74 .75 .01 
  Latino .91 .85 .78 .68 -.07* 
  Diff. .19*** .12*** - - -.06* 
2012 No White .67 .67 .67 .67 - 
  Latino .70 .73 .75 .78 - 
  Diff. - - - - - 
 Yes White .85 .85 .85 .86 .00 
  Latino .83 .78 .71 .64 -.06+ 
  Diff. - -.08+ -.14* -.22* -.06+ 
2014 No White .63 .62 .61 .60 - 
  Latino .60 .51 .42 .34 - 
  Diff. - - - - - 
 Yes White .82 .83 .84 .86 .01 
  Latino .92 .85 .71 .55 -.10*** 
  Diff. .11** - -.13* -.31*** -.09*** 
2016 No White .74 .71 .66 .62 - 
  Latino .63 .69 .75 .80 - 
  Diff. - - - - - 
 Yes White .93 .89 .82 .74 -.05* 
  Latino .97 .92 .82 .66 -.07+ 
  Diff. - - - - - 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 26 contains predicted probability estimates of voting for every level of the 
RTS for Whites and Latinos, by election cycle, and for whether contact was reported by 
respondents. In the midterm elections, contacted Latinos saw an average decline between 
7 and 10 percent for every level of increasing risk with the RTS. In practice, voting 
differences between the risk averse (RTS=1; 91% in 2010 and 92% in 2014) and risk 
accepting (RTS=4; 68% in 2010 and 55% in 2014) were rather large. These findings 
indicate that nearly all Latinos that were contacted and were risk averse voted, while 
contacted risk-accepting Latino were not as psychologically invested despite the 
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invitation to participation. I also observe a decline in voting by an average of 10% among 
non-contacted Latinos in 2010 but the result is not replicated in 2014, so it is difficult to 
say that the risk averse continue to vote at relatively high levels when not being 
contacted.  
A new result is that campaign contact teased out the effect of the RTS among 
Latinos in presidential elections. For 2012 and 2016, the RTS is associated with average 
declining propensities of voting of 6 and 7 percent, both significant at the 90% level, for 
Latinos that were contacted. The negative effect of the RTS in 2016 for Whites is also 
evident as one that is dependent on campaign contact, as risk attitudes became a more 
important part of White voting in 2016. 
The evidence points out that the RTS maintained a negative effect on voting 
because participation rates were very high among respondents that were contacted and 
reported risk aversion. Contact was not as mobilizing for those who report risk 
acceptance, as the messaging they were receiving was not having the intended effect of 
driving them to the polls. Conceptually, risk-accepting respondents are indicated by the 
RTS as willing to leave their current job for a new one that might double earnings but 
also risk the loss of current earnings. Latinos in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 (and Whites 
in 2016) who were willing to do so had a mindset of accepting risk to get ahead, of facing 
uncertainty for the shot at a better standard of living. Those that are risk accepting are 
located in the domain of loss, where high gains despite uncertain probabilities of success 
are appealing because they might lead to new conditions. Campaign messaging drawing 
on these themes may be more effective on the risk accepting than traditional means, 
which are appealing to the risk averse. To do, voter mobilization efforts would screen 
potential voters based on risk attitudes and deliver to them domain of gains (for risk 
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